

Effectiveness of MSD employment assistance

Report for 2019/2020 financial year

November 2021

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# Executive summary

The purpose of this annual report is to track overall progress on delivering effective employment assistance (EA) interventions. The report summarises the Ministry’s evidence on the effectiveness of its expenditure on EA interventions up to the end of the 2019/2020 financial year. EA expenditure covers discrete programmes and services designed to help people to prepare for, find, and keep employment.

While informative, the information in this report lacks the necessary detail for making decisions on the future of individual EA interventions. For example, there could be a range of policy and operational responses to addressing poorly performing interventions. Conversely, while it is tempting to increase funding for interventions identified as ‘effective’, care should be taken to avoid over investment (i.e. exceeding the level of need) as well as compromising an intervention’s fidelity through rapid scale up.

### Impact of COVID

The COVID-19 lockdown affected the results for 2019/2020 report in the following ways:

* the lockdown reduced spending on EA interventions in the last quarter of 2019/2020
* the lockdown delayed implementation of new initiatives as well as the evaluation of new interventions, such as Mana in Mahi and Oranga Mahi
* we have excluded the COVID Wage Subsidy Scheme from the analysis because of its size (over $14 billion) and one-off nature.

MSD is planning to examine the effectiveness of related responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, including the Wage Subsidy Scheme itself as well as the expansion of the post-COVID recovery programmes such as Flexi-wage. In addition, we plan to look at what effect the economic disruption of COVID-19 has had on the effectiveness of EA interventions included in this report.

### Main changes from the 2019 report

This report updates the analysis from the last review to 2019/2020 (de Boer & Ku, 2019). The report also includes a substantial change to the method used to estimate the impact of EA interventions, which means it is not possible to compare results across different versions of reports. This change affected the interventions evaluated using propensity score matching (PSM). In 2019, we based PSM on profile information from MSD data only. In this report, the majority of PSM impacts use profiles built from SNZ IDI data. The advantage of SNZ IDI data is its inclusion of a wider range of profile information to match on (e.g. education, income, justice, childhood, geo-economic and demographic characteristics). Matching on a broader set of characteristics improves our confidence that the results reported here are an accurate reflection of the true impact of these interventions. Refer to the technical report for more detail (de Boer & Ku, 2021).

## Key results

### MSD spent $435.5 million on EA assistance in 2019/2020

In the 2019/2020 financial year, we estimate that MSD spent a total of $435.5 million0F0F[[1]](#footnote-2) on EA interventions. This was a decrease from the previous financial year ($467.8 million), in part, because of the COVID lockdown in the last quarter of 2019/2020.

### In 2019/2020 we could rate the effectiveness for half of the EA expenditure

In 2019/2020 we could rate the effectiveness of $218.5 million (50.2% of total expenditure).1F1F[[2]](#footnote-3) The remaining expenditure could not be evaluated because:

* it was not feasible ($193.7 million)
* it was too soon to report ($6.9 million)
* the analysis has not been undertaken as yet ($16.4 million).

The majority of not rated expenditure was on childcare assistance ($145.3 million).

### Level of expenditure with an effectiveness rating has not changed over the last three financial years

2019/2020 saw a small increase in spending that we could rate for effectiveness compared to the previous financial year. The highest amount of EA expenditure with an effectiveness rating was in 2010/2011 at $292.8 million, falling to its lowest point in 2016/2017 at $217.4 million. The proportion of more recent spend with an effectiveness rating is lower than earlier years because of lags in undertaking impact evaluations for newer initiatives such as Mana in Mahi ($6.9 million).

### Of rated EA interventions, 78.8% of expenditure was on promising or effective interventions

In 2019/2020, the amount spent on EA interventions that we rated as ‘effective’ or ‘promising’ made up the largest proportion of the evaluated spend at $172.2 million out of $218.5 million. Effective interventions show positive impacts on one or more outcome domains and no negative effects. Promising interventions are those that, based on current trends, are likely to be effective over the long-term.

However, the total level of expenditure in the effective and promising categories has decreased since the high point of 2013/2014 ($192.3 million). In the last four years the fall in effective expenditure was led by the reduction in spending on Training for Work and Flexi-wage (Basic/Plus).

### $19.2 million was spent on interventions making no difference

After effective and promising, the second largest spend was on EA interventions where impacts were not found to be statistically significant and are accordingly rated as ‘making no difference’ ($19.2 million). This category includes many smaller interventions that, because of the small participant numbers, it is difficult to identify whether the intervention’s impacts are statistically significant or not.

### $9.5 million was spent on interventions with a mixed rating

By ‘mixed’ we mean that interventions have both positive and negative impacts. A common pattern is for programmes with a mixed rating is to increase income and time in employment, but also reduce time spent in study and result in lower qualifications gained than the comparison group.

### Interventions with a negative rating are under active review

In 2019/2020 $17.5 million was spent on interventions that had a ‘likely negative’ or ‘negative’ rating. The main intervention in this category was Youth Service (NEETs) ($15.4 million). In response to earlier assessments of the negative impact of Youth Service NEETs, the Ministry has scaled down the size of the programme and has redesigned aspects of the service to improve its performance. These changes were implemented at the start of 2020. However, it is too soon to assess whether these changes have improved the performance of the service.

Flexi-Wage Self-Employment ($2.1 million) also has a negative rating, by reducing the total income of the participants relative to the comparison group. Under the Flexi-wage expansion MSD plans to undertake pilots to test the right mix of pastoral care, mentoring and business support needed to help people start their own business. These pilots will focus on helping Māori and Pacific people in particular. Alongside Flexi-wage Self Employment, the maximum grant for the Business Training and Advice Grant (BTAG) increased from $1,000 to $5,000.

# Introduction

This annual report summarises the Ministry’s evidence on the effectiveness of its employment assistance (EA) expenditure to the end of the 2019/2020 financial year. The purpose of this report is to show progress towards delivering effective EA interventions. In doing so, MSD can demonstrate both its implementation of the government’s investing for social wellbeing approach and meet its obligations under the Public Finance Act.2F2F[[3]](#footnote-4)

The purpose of this report is to track overall progress on delivering effective EA interventions. While informative on overall trends, this report lacks the necessary detail for making decisions on the future of specific EA interventions.

### Impact of COVID

The COVID-19 lockdown affected the results for 2019/2020 report in the following ways:

* the lockdown reduced spending on EA interventions in the last quarter of 2019/2020
* the lockdown delayed implementation of new initiatives as well as the evaluation of new interventions, such as Mana in Mahi and Oranga Mahi
* we have excluded the COVID wage subsidy programme from the analysis because of its size (over $14 billion) and one-off nature.

MSD is planning to examine the effectiveness of related responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, including the Wage Subsidy Scheme itself as well as the expansion of the post-COVID recovery programmes such as Flexi-wage. In addition, we plan to look at what effect the economic disruption of COVID-19 has had on the effectiveness of EA interventions included in this report.

### Main changes from the 2019 report

This report updates the analysis from the last review to 2019/2020 (de Boer & Ku, 2019). In addition, the report also includes a substantial change to the method used to estimate the impact of EA interventions. This change affected the interventions evaluated using propensity score matching (PSM). In 2019, we based PSM on profile information from MSD data only. In the current report, the majority of PSM impacts use profiles built from SNZ IDI data. The advantage of SNZ IDI data is its inclusion of a wider range of profile information to match on (e.g. education, income, justice, childhood, geo-economic and demographic characteristics). Matching on a broader set of characteristics improves our confidence that the results reported here are an accurate reflection of the true impact of these interventions. See the technical report for more detail (de Boer & Ku, 2021).

Unlike the 2019 report, the current report focuses on discrete EA interventions and not on case management (CM) services. The reason for this narrower focus is that we have not updated the analysis of the effectiveness of CM services since the 2019 report (de Boer & Ku, 2019). Since the 2019 report, MSD has made substantial changes how case management services operate, especially in response to the disruption caused by COVID. Currently, we do not have any evidence on the effectiveness of these new case management approaches.

## Definition of Employment Assistance

In the literature there are several overlapping definitions of EA interventions, also referred to as Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs). In this report, we define EA interventions as those designed to help people prepare, find, move into, and keep employment. Within this definition, the term EA intervention includes discrete policies, services and programmes either run internally by MSD staff or contracted out to external providers by MSD. Note that some interventions included in this report may have other objectives alongside employment.

## Assessing intervention effectiveness

By effectiveness, we mean whether an EA intervention improves participants’ outcomes relative to the counterfactual (ie the outcomes participants would have had if they had not participated). In the current analysis, we assess effectiveness against five main outcomes that we expect EA interventions to have a positive impact on.

* **Employment**: the overarching goal of EA interventions is to increase the time participants spend in employment over the long term.
* **Income**: we judge interventions to have a positive impact if they increase participants’ overall income.3F3F[[4]](#footnote-5)
* **Justice**: interventions are effective if they reduce time in corrections services.
* **Education qualifications**: effective interventions can also increase the participants’ highest education achievement as measured by the National Qualifications Framework (NQF).
* **Welfare**: most, but not all, EA interventions aim to reduce the time people spend on a main benefit and is measured here through the reduction in income support assistance payments.

While these outcome domains are important, we acknowledge that they are not comprehensive. We plan to increase the number of outcome domains included in the analysis over subsequent reports such as mortality and health care use.

### The length of the outcome period is important

The impact of EA interventions on outcomes changes with the duration of the follow up period after a person starts an intervention. It is common to see that, while people are on a programme, there are short-term negative impacts. Such impacts are referred to as ‘lock-in’ effects. Lock in effects mostly occur for longer duration programmes or where the purpose of the programme is to gain a qualification. For such programmes, participants have less time to look for work or prefer gaining the qualification over job offers.

On the other hand, the benefits of EA interventions often occur after completion. For some interventions, such as training programmes, these positive effects may not outweigh the early lock-in effect until years after participants started the training. The problem for judging effectiveness is that observed impacts capture short term effects but may miss any longer-term positive impacts. For this reason, we include estimates of unobserved long-term impacts to provide a balanced assessment of EA interventions’ overall impact.

At a minimum, we reserve judgement on whether an intervention is likely to be ineffective until we have at least two years of post-participation impacts. Of course, if an intervention shows positive impacts sooner than this, then it is rated as effective before the two year wait period.

### Effectiveness rating

Based on the impact on one or more of the above outcome domains, we categorise EA interventions into the following groups:

* **Effective**: the intervention has significant positive overall impact on one or more outcome domain and no negative impacts for any other domain.
* **Promising**: trend in impacts across outcome domains indicates the intervention is expected to have a significant positive overall impact over the medium to long term.
* **Mixed**: the intervention has both positive and negative impacts on different outcome domains (e.g. positive impact on income support payments, but a negative impact on overall income).
* **Makes no difference**: the intervention makes no significant difference on any outcome domain.
* **Likely negative**: based on the trend in intervention impacts we expect it to have a long-term negative overall impact on one or more outcome domains.
* **Negative**: the intervention has a significantly negative overall impact for one or more outcome domain and no positive impacts for any other.

In addition to the effectiveness categories above, we have three additional categories for non-rated EA interventions.

* **Too soon to rate**: there has been insufficient time to judge whether the intervention is effective. A discussed above, we do not rate an intervention until we have at least two years of outcome results unless it shows unambiguously positive impacts within the two-year window.
* **Not feasible**: it is currently not technically possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention.
* **Not rated**: we have not yet assessed the effectiveness of the intervention.

We have a separate technical report that provides further detail on how we estimated the impact of EA interventions and how we rated each intervention’s overall effectiveness (de Boer & Ku, 2021).

## Important aspects of the analysis

There are several aspects of the analysis that the reader needs to keep in mind.

### Estimation of effectiveness

Determining the difference interventions make to participant outcomes is technically difficult. We use a range of methods to estimate the impact, from very robust methods, such as Randomised Control Trials (RCT), through to less robust methods, such as Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and natural experiments. For the latter group of methods, there is a risk that the reported impacts may be biased (ie the reported impact either over or underestimates the true impact). Having said this, the impacts presented in this report are the best currently available for each EA intervention.

Where we consider there is no sufficiently robust method, we define the intervention effectiveness as ‘Not feasible’. We acknowledge that it is a judgement call as to whether an impact method is sufficiently robust. Within this reporting series, we have changed previously rated interventions to be not feasible. For example, in previous reports, we gave an effectiveness rating to widespread, high-frequency job search seminars, but we now consider it is not feasible to estimate the impact of these types of interventions as individual events. This issue is picked up in more detail later in the report.

### Intervention effectiveness is measured relative to the assistance received by the comparison group

A critical point with interpreting effectiveness is that an intervention’s impact is relative to the experience of the comparison group, specifically what assistance they receive. Because there are few cases where it is possible to deny all possible alternative assistance to comparison group members, impact estimates are interpreted as the causal effect of participating in the intervention relative to what assistance they would have received if they had not participated. In other words, it is rare we can identify the impact of an intervention relative to a ‘no intervention’ counterfactual. In contexts where a high proportion of the comparison group receives alternative forms of effective assistance, then the observed impact for the intervention will be lower than where the comparison group receives little assistance.

### Some interventions are worth funding even if we cannot assess their effectiveness

As observed in the previous paragraph, while we strive to assess the effectiveness of all interventions, this is not always possible. However, not being able to assess effectiveness should not preclude funding an intervention if, on balance, it is believed that it meets a real need and is likely to be effective, based on indirect evidence. For example, there is little debate about the need to provide childcare payments to enable low-income families to work.

Alternatively, if there is doubt about the effectiveness of an intervention, then one response would be to commission an evaluation with a robust impact method. For example, while it is not possible to assess many transition-to-work interventions using quasi-experimental methods, these can be assessed using a RCT methodology.

### Effectiveness ratings do change

We continually update the analysis underpinning this report. Updates involve:

* extending our follow-up period for measuring intervention’s impacts (currently at a maximum of 19 years)
* adding new interventions
* improvements, and corrections to our methodology.

These updates can result in changes in the effectiveness rating of interventions between reports in this series. The biggest change so far has been the rating of self-employment subsidies that have shifted from an effective to a negative rating.

Similarly, the performance of individual interventions has changed over time. In this report series, we make separate assessments of each intervention’s effectiveness based on the participants’ start year. Therefore, changes to design, targeting and operation of interventions will be reflected in the effectiveness ratings for each year the intervention operates.

### We have not accounted for non-participant effects

The focus of this report is on interventions’ impact on participants’ outcomes. We have not accounted for impacts on non-participants. For EA interventions, two important non-participant effects are (i) substitution and (ii) displacement. Substitution occurs when a participant takes a vacancy that would have been filled by someone else and is most likely to occur for job placement programmes. Displacement occurs when subsidised labour can reduce employment among competing firms and is of most concern for subsidy-based interventions.

### No cross-validation with international evidence

At this stage, we have not included international evidence. Cross-validation with international experience is useful in identifying where New Zealand’s experience differs from other jurisdictions. In cases where there is contradictory evidence, we need to more carefully understand why there is a difference.

### Assessing diverse interventions against a common standard

In some cases, EA interventions have objectives not included in the outcomes covered in this report. We acknowledge that we may understate the full scope of these interventions.

At the other end of the spectrum, some EA interventions may seek to increase employment, but not to reduce time on main benefit (eg for people with health problems or disabilities for whom full-time work may not be an option). In the analysis, we do not penalise an intervention if it has no significant impact on one or more outcome domain (eg an effective intervention can increase employment, but not change time on main benefit). However, we argue that interventions should at minimum have no negative impacts against the above outcome domains (eg if an intervention increases employment, but also increase income support assistance, then it is given a mixed rating).

### No assessment of the relative size of effects

The effectiveness rating assessment does not account for the relative size of effects. In other words, are the impacts large compared to the cost of the intervention? We plan to address this issue through later cost-benefit analysis that will enable better accounting of both the size and direction of intervention effects.

### Two-year outcome period may be too short for some interventions

For certain interventions, such as long-term training programmes, it can take longer than two years before we see an overall positive impact. We partly address this issue by including the projection of the long-term impact of interventions in our analysis. However, it may still be the case that for these interventions, as well as for certain subgroups, such as sole parents, we need to allow a longer period before determining if the intervention is effective overall.

### No assessment effectiveness for sub-groups of participants

The current analysis has not looked at whether there is any variation in the effectiveness of EA interventions across participant groups. It may well be that interventions are more effective for some groups and not for others. Such findings could help with targeting of programmes and services to improve their effectiveness. We plan to include some sub-group analysis in later reports.

### Estimation of intervention cost

In this report we estimate the full cost of EA interventions, including indirect costs such as property, ICT and national office functions. For some costs such as subsidies there is a direct relationship between financial information and the intervention. However, for aspects such a staff time we rely on a cost allocation model to estimate what share of these costs are allocated to each intervention (see Appendix 2).

We make regular updates to the cost allocation model in response to the latest information on different costs and how they should be allocated to interventions. For this reason, readers should treat the expenditure values in this report as estimates and values that may change between reports.

### Information in this report is insufficient for making decisions on the future of individual EA interventions

As the previous comments make clear, the information in this report, on its own, is insufficient to make recommendations on the future of any individual intervention. Instead, the findings in the report help point to where we need to better understand the effectiveness of individual EA interventions. It is through this more detailed investigation of the evidence that informs the future of the interventions covered in this report.

## Structure of the report

The report is structured as follows:

* The main body of the report summarises the evidence on the effectiveness of EA expenditure in the 2019/2020 financial year compared with previous financial years.
* Appendix 1 provides a tabular summary of effectiveness results for individual EA interventions and describes an accompanying data file (csv) with the numerical outcome and impact estimates for all EA interventions included in this report.
* Appendix 2 describes how we estimated the cost of EA interventions and accompanying csv data file.
* Appendix 3 shows the change in expenditure for individual interventions by effectiveness rating.
* Appendix 4 gives short descriptions of the interventions covered in this report.

A summary of the method underpinning the analysis is in a separate technical report (de Boer & Ku, 2021).

# The effectiveness of EA interventions in 2019/2020

In the 2019/2020 financial year, we estimate MSD spent a total of $435.5 million on employment interventions, of which we could rate the effectiveness of $218.5 million (50.2%) see Figure 1.

Figure 1: Effectiveness of EA expenditure in 2019/2020



As Figure 1 shows, we could not rate some interventions for three reasons:

* it was not feasible ($193.7 million)
* it was too soon to report ($6.9 million)
* the analysis has not been undertaken as yet ($16.4 million).

The majority of not rated expenditure was on childcare assistance ($145.3 million). For descriptions of what the specific interventions are, please refer to Appendix 4.

Looking at evaluated interventions ($218.5 million), we can see from Figure 1 that:

* $172.2 million (78.8%) went on effective or promising employment assistance
* $9.5 million (4.4%) on interventions that had mixed effects
* $19.2 million (8.8%) that made no difference
* $17.5 million (8%) had either likely negative or negative impacts.

## The trend in EA expenditure over time

Figure 2 summarises the total expenditure on EA interventions over each financial year from 2010/2011 onwards.

Figure 2: Total expenditure on EA interventions by financial year (millions)



Overlaid in the Figure are the substantial changes in the funding of individual EA interventions for each year. The most important change over the analysis period was the end of Foundation Focused Training over 2012/2013 ($31.7 million) and 2013/2014 ($23.0 million) with the funding transferred to the Ministry of Education.The fall in expenditure in 2019/2020 was because the COVID lockdown resulted in low or no participation in EA interventions over the last quarter of the year. The lockdown had the largest impact on the childcare subsidy programme, with expenditure falling by $37.4 million.

## The trend in performance over time

Figure 3 compares the effectiveness of EA expenditure over the financial years between 2010/2011 and 2019/2020. The effectiveness rating refers to the experience of people who participated in that year, based on the most up to date evidence available. Therefore, expenditure for a given intervention may have different effectiveness rating depending on the participation year as shown in Table 1. For example, the noticeable increase in expenditure rated as Mixed in 2012/2013 and to return to the previous level the following year was because Vacancy Placement Full-time ($24.3 million) had a mixed rating in 2012/2013 year, while being rated as effective for all other years in the chart.

Figure 3: Effectiveness rating of EA expenditure by financial year



The main theme from Figure 3 is the fall in expenditure across most categories through a long-term downward trend in expenditure on EA interventions as shown in Figure 2. Expenditure on interventions in the Effective/Promising increased until 2013/2014. Over the most recent three financial years the amount of spend in this category has decreased through reductions in expenditure on Training for Work and Flexi-wage (Basic/Plus).

Expenditure in the other categories have fallen in the period to 2014/2015. From then on, the level of expenditure on Mixed, and Likely negative/Negative have remained relatively stable. While small, expenditure on interventions making No difference has increased over the last four financial years.

Table 1 shows the main changes in effectiveness rating by intervention and financial year. For example, Foundation Focused Training had a number of changes in its effectiveness rating over the period between 2011/2012 and 2012/2013 that help explain the overall shifts in the expenditure by effectiveness rating over this period.

Table 1: Timeline of key changes to EA expenditure by effectiveness rating

| Intervention | Rating From | Rating To |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Financial Year: 2011/2012** |
| Employment Placement or Assistance Initiative ($18.6m) | No difference | Effective/Promising |
| Job Opportunities with Training ($14.5m) | - | No difference |
| **Financial Year: 2012/2013** |
| Foundation Focused Training ($54.7m) | No difference | Mixed |
| Flexi-wage ($30.7m) | - | Mixed |
| Skills Investment ($25.8m) | Mixed | - |
| Skills for Industry ($19m) | - | Effective/Promising |
| **Financial Year: 2013/2014** |
| Flexi-wage ($36.5m) | Mixed | Effective/Promising |
| **Financial Year: 2014/2015** |
| Vacancy Placement Full time ($19.4m) | Effective/Promising | Mixed |
| Work Confidence ($11m) | No difference | Effective/Promising |
| **Financial Year: 2015/2016** |
| Vacancy Placement Full time ($18.2m) | Mixed | Effective/Promising |
| **Financial Year: 2016/2017** |
| Employment Participation and Inclusion services ($31.4m) | - | Effective/Promising |
| Dollars are in nominals (not CPI-adjusted). Only showing interventions with more than $4 million in expenditure. Dash (-) indicates the intervention either did not exist previously or ended in the reference year.Source: Ministry of Social Development & Statistics New Zealand Integrated Data Infrastructure, June 2021. |

## Employment Assistance intervention performance in 2019/2020

Table 2 shows effectiveness ratings for EA interventions funded in the 2019/2020 financial year. For detailed results on individual interventions, refer to Appendix 1.

Table 2: EA interventions by effectiveness rating in 2019/2020

| Effective/Promising | Mixed/No difference/Negative |
| --- | --- |
| **EFFECTIVE ($96.9m)**Employment Participation and Inclusion services ($29.6m)Employment Placement or Assistance Initiative ($24.5m)Vacancy Placement Full time ($16.3m)Jobseeker Support Work Ready 52-week benefit reapplication ($8.3m)Job Search Initiatives ($7.3m)Training for Work ($5.3m)Vacancy Placement Part time ($2.7m)Training Incentive Allowance ($1.2m)Work Confidence ($1m)WRK4U ($0.5m)Sole Parent Support Study Assistance ($0.1m)**PROMISING ($75.3m)**Skills for Industry ($40.1m)Flexi-wage ($24.6m)Youth Service (YP) ($9.3m)Work to Wellness ($1.4m) | **MIXED ($9.5m)**Limited Services Volunteer ($9.5m)**NO DIFFERENCE ($19.2m)**Youth Service (YPP) ($6.3m)New Initiative ($5.8m)Course Participation Assistance ($3.1m)Work Preparation Services ($1.6m)Activity in the Community ($1m)In-Work Support (IWS) trial ($0.4m)Work Ability Assessment ($0.3m)Be Your Own Boss ($0.3m)Health Interventions ($0.3m)Business Training And Advice Grant ($0.2m)**NEGATIVE ($17.5m)**Youth Service (NEET) ($15.4m)Flexi-Wage Self-Employment ($2.1m) |
| a, Values are nominal (not CPI-adjusted)b, Interventions with less than $100,000 of expenditure in the financial year are suppressed.c, These results cover all EA interventions irrespective of funding source, for this reason, the expenditure reported here is higher than reported in MSD’s annual report EA effectiveness performance measure that covers interventions funded through the Improved Employment and Social Outcomes Support MCA.Source: Ministry of Social Development & Statistics New Zealand Integrated Data Infrastructure, June 2021. |

### Effective/Promising ($172.2 million)

Effective and promising EA interventions have overall positive impacts across one or more of the five main outcome domains. We can categorise effective/promising EA interventions into five broad types.

#### Job placement interventions

These include vacancy placement in-house (Full time, $16.3 million and Part-time, $2.7 million) and contracted out work brokerage services (Employment Placement or Assistance Initiative, $24.5 million), hiring subsidies (Flexi-Wage, $24.6 million) and training for pre-determined employment (Skills for Industry, $40.1 million). We need to acknowledge that while job placement interventions are effective for participants, they can have negative impacts on non-participants4F4F[[5]](#footnote-6) that we have not considered in this analysis.

#### Work obligation focused interventions

Interventions that use work obligation requirements to ensure people are actively seeking employment. This group includes the 52-week reapplication for Jobseeker Support Work Ready ($8.3 million)5F5F[[6]](#footnote-7) and the pre-benefit seminar WRK4U ($485.7,000).6F6F[[7]](#footnote-8)

However, these results are based only on the impact on independence from employment and income assistance;7F7F[[8]](#footnote-9) we have not yet estimated the impact of these interventions on other outcome domains such as employment and income.

#### Short-term training courses

Training for Work ($5.3 million) contracts short duration training courses for people who are likely to be on a main benefit long term. This contrasts with earlier longer-term contracted training programmes such as Training Opportunities (ceased 2010) and Foundation Focused Training (ceased 2014) where performance was more variable.

#### Financial support for study

In addition to contracted training, a number of EA interventions provide financial support to people to undertake study in the general education sector. Training Incentive Allowance ($1.2 million) and Course Participation Assistance ($3.1 million) both show positive impacts.

However, we note that while this assistance reduces the financial cost of studying, they may not be instrumental in the decision to undertake this study in the first place. To put this another way, participation in the programme may occur *after* the decision to take up study. Therefore, these results could reflect higher motivation by the participants to start study than those in the comparison group.

#### Employment support for people with health or disabilities

This is the first year that Employment Participation and Inclusion services ($29.6 million), previously Vocational Services Employment, has been rated as effective. This intervention has shown improved effectiveness over time, with positive impacts on income and income support payments from 2012 onwards in addition to the long-standing positive impact on employment.

### Mixed ($9.5 million)

Mixed interventions have both positive and negative impacts. A common pattern for interventions in this group is to increase the both time in employment and, through increased labour market income, increase net income. However, the increased time in employment often results in less time spent in education or training by the participants relative to the comparison group. A secondary impact of less time in study is that participants gain qualifications at a lower rate than the comparison group. We have not determined if a negative impact on the rate of qualification gained reduces participant’s longer-term outcomes. Positive long-term impacts on net-income suggests the return from increased employment exceeds any cost from having lower qualifications. The Limited Services Volunteer (LSV) programme ($9.5 million) was the only intervention with a mixed rating in 2019/2020.

### No difference ($19.2 million)

Interventions with a no difference rating are mostly small scale. For these interventions the small number of participants means it is difficult to identify whether the intervention has had a positive impact on outcomes.

### Likely negative and Negative ($17.5 million)

At present there are two types of interventions that show negative impacts on participant’s outcomes: youth transition services and self-employment subsidy programmes.

#### Youth Transition Services

The Youth Service (NEET) targets young people transitioning from school who are at risk of not participating in education, training, or employment. Initial analysis by The Treasury (Dixon & Crichton, 2016) found it did achieve the goals of increasing education retention and increasing NQF 2 qualifications gained. However, these did not translate into improvements in later outcomes. The updated analysis for this report confirms these earlier findings, with Youth Service (NEET) having either no significant impact or negative impact on all five outcome domains.

These results apply to the service before the most recent contract round that began in January 2020. The new contract involved changes in both the service’s design and which providers deliver the service. We will continue to monitor the effectiveness of the Youth Service (NEET) in response to these changes. But, because of the elapsed time needed to track the outcomes of the post-2020 participants, it is unlikely that we can report on the effect of the 2020 changes until the 2022/2023 report.

#### Self-employment subsidy programmes

Self-employment financial assistance (Flexi-Wage Self-Employment, $2.1 million) had a negative impact on net-income and made no significant difference to the time in employment (including self-employment). An earlier self-employment subsidy programme called Enterprise Allowance also significantly reduced net income and made no significant difference to the time in employment over a 16 year follow up period. The negative impact for self-employment assistance on income may reflect the tax efficiency of self-employment relative to receiving wages or salary.

Under the Flexi-wage Expansion starting in 2021, the Ministry is planning to undertake pilots to test the right mix of pastoral care, mentoring and business support needed to help people to start their own business and increase the amount payable each week. We will continue to monitor Flexi-wage Self-employment to see if these changes translate to improvements in its effectiveness.

## Not rated interventions ($217.1 million)

In this section of the report we examine the overall trend in EA expenditure by whether it has an effectiveness rating or not.

Of the total expenditure on discrete EA interventions, the amount given an effectiveness rating decreased from 2010/2011 through to 2016/2017 (Figure 4). Over the last three years to 2019/2020 the amount of expenditure with a rating has remained relatively stable. The long-term decrease in rated expenditure has been driven both by a general decline in expenditure on EA interventions, as well as the removal of funding for ineffective interventions such as Foundation Focused Training.

Figure 4: EA intervention expenditure by whether the intervention has been rated or not



Table 3 breaks down the not rated EA intervention expenditure by reason for the 2019/2020 financial year. There are three broad reasons for not having an effectiveness rating for an intervention: (i) too soon to rate, (ii) not feasible and (iii) not completed.

### Too soon to rate ($6.9 million)

We are in the process of evaluating the effectiveness of Mana in Mahi ($6.9 million). Early findings show Mana in Mahi increases time in employment and total income. But because of lags in education data, we do not yet have information on the impact of the programme on study and qualifications gained.

### Not feasible ($193.7 million)

These are interventions implemented in such a way that it is not currently possible to estimate the difference they make. A not feasible assessment does not rule out the possibility of evaluating these interventions in the future. However, to do so would require a dedicated evaluation design. Such designs would either involve some form of randomisation or a change to the delivery of these interventions. Below are the broad reasons why it is not currently possible to evaluate a given interventions’ effectiveness with Table 5 in Appendix 1 providing specific explanation for each intervention listed in Table 3.

Table 3: EA interventions not rated for effectiveness in 2019/2020

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Not feasible | No rated/Too soon to rate |
| **NOT FEASIBLE ($193.6m)**Childcare Subsidy ($145.3m)OSCAR Provider Assistance ($21m)Transition to Work Grant ($19.6m)$5k to Work ($2.9m)Regional Economic Development ($1.8m)Work Bonus ($1.5m)Work and Income Seminar ($0.6m)Flexible Childcare Assistance ($0.5m)Oranga Mahi - Well Plan ($0.2m)Seasonal Work Assistance ($0.2m)New Employment Transition Grant ($0.2m) | **NOT RATED ($16.3m)**Sole Parent Support 52-week reapplication ($4.4m)Jobseeker Support Health Condition or Disability 52-week reapplication ($2.9m)Mainstream Employment Programme ($2.4m)Flexi-wage Project in the Community ($1.6m)Oranga Mahi - REACH ($1.2m)Information Services Initiative ($1m)Driver licence programmes ($0.9m)Oranga Mahi - Step Up ($0.6m)Oranga Mahi - Rākau Rangatira ($0.5m)Oranga Mahi - Take Charge ($0.4m)Youth Seminar ($0.2m)Work Focused Case Management Extension (ICS-X) ($0.1m)**TOO SOON TO RATE ($6.9m)**Mana in Mahi ($6.9m) |
| a, These results cover all EA interventions irrespective of funding source, for this reason, the expenditure reported here is higher than reported in MSD’s annual report EA effectiveness performance measure that covers interventions funded through the Improved Employment and Social Outcomes Support MCA.b, Values are nominal (not CPI-adjusted)c, Interventions with less than $100,000 of expenditure in the financial year are suppressed.Source: Ministry of Social Development, June 2021. |

#### Entitlement based interventions

Although most EA interventions are discretionary, there is a number where the entitlement is defined in law. The largest intervention in this group is Childcare Assistance (Childcare Subsidy8F8F[[9]](#footnote-10), $145.3 million, OSCAR Provider Assistance, $21 million) where everyone who is eligible, and would like to use Childcare Assistance, can do so. As a result, there is no comparable group of non-participating parents to compare against the participants. We also do not have a historical comparison group, as childcare assistance has been available since before our administrative records began in 1993.

It may be possible to examine the effectiveness of childcare assistance indirectly through an information campaign where one group is given information about their entitlement and another is not. By comparing the two groups, we can see if the information (i) increases take-up and, if take-up does increase, (ii) what impact this has on subsequent outcomes.

#### Difficult to identify counterfactual group

Several interventions occur during a transition period (i.e. from benefit to work) or natural disasters. Here we run into the problem of identifying the potential participant population to draw a convincing comparison group from. For example, many interventions that assist with the transition to employment (e.g. Transition to Work Grant, $19.6 million) are often provided in anticipation of an exit. Alternatively, in the case of Work Bonus ($1.5 million), the bonus is only paid if the participant achieves the contracted outcome. Under these conditions, it is difficult to identify the equivalent population that is in the same transition state but did not participate in the intervention.

Another set of interventions try to increase the range of job opportunities available to people on income support. For example, $5k to Work ($2.9 million) enables people to move locations to take up employment outside their immediate labour market. Here the effect of the intervention is on those *eligible* to receive the assistance. However, because take-up is low, it would be difficult to identify the impact of these types of interventions, even with the best available methods.

#### Low cost and frequent interventions

MSD Service Delivery runs many short duration and frequent interventions, such as job search seminars or case-management interviews. Showing the individual impact of these interventions is difficult for two reasons. First is that the individual effect of each seminar or interview attendance is expected to be small. The second reason is that, because of the wide coverage, we again run into the issue of a plausible comparison group, as non-participants are unusual in some way as to not have participated in this type of intervention.

The strategy to overcome this problem has been to evaluate these interventions as part of CM services, see de Boer (2019). For example, frequent job search seminars were part of the Work Search Support (WSS) service. Here we estimated the impact of being assigned to WSS (participating in frequent seminars) to an equivalent group of people assigned to other CM services and did not participate in these seminars.9F9F[[10]](#footnote-11)

#### Strong selection on unobserved characteristics

The final set of interventions that are currently infeasible to rate are those where we consider that there is strong selection on unobserved characteristics (eg motivation, attitude, social support). Selection on unobservable characteristics means we are unsure whether any subsequent differences in outcomes between participants and a comparison group is because of the intervention or because of prior uncontrolled differences between the two groups. For example, the Sustainable Employment Trial is for people on Supported Living Payment (SLP) wanting to try working more than 15 hours a week for a six-month period. In this example, we cannot reliably identify the underlying motivation for why an individual on SLP would decide to increase their hours of work. The only way to robustly estimate the impact of these types of interventions is to run a Randomised Control Trial.

### Not completed ($16.4 million)

The remaining expenditure includes EA interventions that we can feasibly evaluate, but we have not done so at this time. The spend in this category is higher than normal because of delays in completing the impact analysis brought on by the COVID lockdown. Specifically, lockdown limited the time researchers could work in the Statistics New Zealand data labs. Affected interventions included Oranga Mahi ($2.2 million) which were to be included in this year’s report.

# Effectiveness by intervention type

Here we show the effectiveness rating by the type of EA intervention. In this section, we broaden our scope to include all EA interventions delivered by MSD, not just those delivered in 2019/2020 (Table 4).

Table 4: Effectiveness of employment assistance intervention by type

| Intervention type | Total | Rated | Effective/Promising | Mixed | No difference | Likely negative/Negative |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Case Management | 71 | 12 | 66% | - | 16% | 16% |
| Community Development | 7 | 1 | - | - | - | 100% |
| Information Services | 9 | 1 | - | 100% | - | - |
| Health Interventions | 7 | 2 | 50% | - | 50% | - |
| Work Confidence | 22 | 3 | 33% | 33% | 33% | - |
| Vocational Services | 2 | 2 | 100% | - | - | - |
| Training | 23 | 9 | 44% | 33% | 11% | 11% |
| Work Obligations | 14 | 2 | 100% | - | - | - |
| Job Search | 23 | 5 | 100% | - | - | - |
| Work Experience | 27 | 10 | 50% | 20% | 10% | 20% |
| Job Placement | 43 | 19 | 57% | 15% | 5% | 21% |
| Work Transition | 19 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Work Retention | 17 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Other | 8 | 3 | 33% | - | 66% | - |
| **Total** | **296** | **71** | **57%** | **14%** | **14%** | **14%** |
| Note the percentage values are based on the number of rated interventions. Due to rounding, percentage values may not add up to 100%.Source: Ministry of Social Development & Statistics New Zealand Integrated Data Infrastructure, June 2021. |

We have information on 296 individual EA interventions and CM (case management) services operating between 1990 and 2018. These range from large interventions, such as Training Opportunities ($80 million pa, 1991-2009) through to small local pilots running for a couple of months. We group these interventions into broad categories reflecting how the intervention is expected to help improve participants’ outcomes. For example, training programmes operate on the idea of increasing participants’ skills or qualifications to help improve their chances of gaining employment.

Of the 296 interventions that we have information on, we can rate the effectiveness of 71 (24%) as shown in Table 4. Alongside the overall low coverage, we also see substantial gaps in our knowledge of the effectiveness for some intervention types. For example, we have only one or two studies on the effectiveness of interventions designed to help with transitioning to and retaining employment.

Note that the percentage values for each rating in Table 4 are based on a relatively small number of observations. Small samples mean the proportional mix of intervention effectiveness may show substantial shifts in future updates to this analysis.

### Job Placement and case management are generally effective

Interventions that tend to improve participants’ outcomes are concentrated around case management and job placement. However, for job placement programmes this optimistic assessment has to be balanced by consideration of the negative effects these interventions can have on non-participants through substitution or displacement effects.

For case-management services, two of the three services rated as negative target young people transitioning from school to education training or employment (Youth Transitions Service, Youth Service (NEET)).

### Variable effectiveness ratings for work experience, job search and information services interventions

Intervention types with a range of effectiveness ratings include work experience programmes and information services. When we look in more detail at these intervention types, we find that work experience with private sector firms is more likely to be rated as effective. On the other hand, community or environmental placements where participants remain on benefit tend not to be effective. For information services and job search type interventions, it is less clear what differentiates those that are effective and those that are not.

#### Work confidence has modest effects

Work confidence interventions (which are intended to improve a participant’s confidence and motivation) have modest impacts, with two-thirds either having mixed or making no difference to participants’ outcomes.

#### Work obligations results apply only to off main benefit outcomes

The evidence on work obligations (interventions that ensure people are actively looking for work) is small relative to the number of interventions. Also, we currently only have evidence of the impact of these interventions on off main benefit outcomes. An important gap in our evidence is on the impact of these interventions on wider outcomes.

#### Training interventions are showing better performance

The evidence on the effectiveness of training programmes indicates more recent contracted training programmes, such as Training for Work, are more effective than earlier versions such as Training Opportunities, Foundation Focused Training and Skills Training. On the other hand, the effectiveness of Training Incentive Allowance appears to have decreased over the last 14 years and is likely to be linked to changes in the scope of the programme over the same period.

# Appendix 1: Effectiveness rating

We categorise the EA interventions based on whether the intervention had a positive impact10F10F[[11]](#footnote-12) on participants’ outcomes across five domains.

### Outcome domains

The effectiveness of each EA interventions is assessed a range of outcome domains. Depending on the intervention, we can measure the effectiveness on one or more of these domains. The impact rating for each outcome domain is based on the impact of the intervention on one outcome measure for each domain. Each outcome measure was selected because we believe it best represents the outcome domain across all interventions.

The outcome domains include:

* **Income:** intervention is rated as effective if it increases net income from all sources including income support, tax credits and study assistance. Therefore, this measure accounts for both any loss of income from government assistance, as well any earnings gains through movement into employment.
* **Employment:** intervention is rated as effective if it increases the time spent in paid employment. This measure includes increases in employment while still on main benefit.
* **Justice** intervention is rated as effective if it reduces the time participants spend in corrections services (i.e. prison, community service, remand, home detention).
* **Qualifications:** intervention is rated as effective if it increases the average of the highest qualification held. Highest qualification is based on NQF levels from 1 through to 9. Therefore, an impact of NQF 1 would mean participants had increased their highest NQF level by an average of 1 level (e.g. from 2.4 to 3.4).
* **Study:** intervention is rated as effective if it increases the time participants spend enrolled in education or training. Note that being enrolled doesn’t necessarily mean a person is attending the course (e.g. they may have dropped out).
* **Welfare:** intervention is rated as effective if it reduces the time participants receive a main benefit (e.g. unemployment, sole parent or health or disability benefits) and receiving employment assistance (e.g. on a wage subsidy programme).

### Effectiveness

By effectiveness, we mean whether an intervention improves participants’ outcomes relative to the counterfactual (ie the outcomes participants would have had if they had not participated). In the current analysis, we assess effectiveness based on the impact of the intervention on one or more outcome domains. However, we cannot assess the effectiveness of all interventions and the reason for not doing so is also reflected in the ratings.

Our analysis of the impact of employment intervention focuses on five outcome domains. These domains broadly reflect the intended medium and long-term objectives of employment interventions. The rating shows the desired direction of the intervention’s impact. The ratings are described as follows:

* **Effective**: the intervention has a statistically significant positive impact on one or more primary outcome (eg income, employment, justice, qualifications or independence from welfare) **and** no evidence of a negative impact on any primary outcome.
* **Promising**: the trend in impacts indicates the intervention is expected to have a significant positive overall impact in the medium to long term. Also, we rate interventions as promising if we cannot evaluate the intervention directly, but where we have a very similar intervention rated as effective.
* **Mixed**: the intervention has both positive and negative impacts on primary outcomes. The most common case is where an intervention increases employment but has a negative impact on welfare.
* **No difference**: the intervention makes no statistically significant difference for any of the primary outcomes. For smaller interventions, this may reflect insufficient statistical power to detect a meaningful impact and these impacts may become significant when an intervention has more participants.
* **Likely negative**: trends indicate the intervention will have a negative impact on one or more primary outcomes and there is no evidence of a positive impact on any other primary outcome in the medium to long-term.
* **Negative**: the intervention has a statistically significant negative impact on one or more primary outcome **and** no evidence of a positive impact on any primary outcome.
* **Too soon to rate**: there has not been enough time to observe the impact of the intervention. Typically, we do not rate an intervention until we have two years of outcome data available.
* **Not rated**: we have not rated the effectiveness of the intervention at this time.
* **Not feasible**: it is not considered feasible to estimate the intervention’s impact based on current data or available methods (ie would require some type of randomised control trial to robustly identify the intervention’s impacts).

## Interventions where it is currently not feasible to estimate their effectiveness

Before looking at the results of interventions with an effectiveness rating, Table 5 lists the EA interventions funded after the 2009/2010 financial year that were not feasible to evaluate and summarises the reason for this assessment.

Table 5: Explanation for not feasible rating by intervention

| Intervention | Reason |
| --- | --- |
| $5k to Work | Finding the impact of $5k to Work is difficult for two reasons. The first is that all job seekers are eligible to receive it. The second is that the take up rate of the payment is low. Together this means the influence of $5k to Work on the outcomes of the target group is small. It may be possible to assess the programme effectiveness by randomising eligible job seekers into a treatment group who are told about $5k to Work and a control group who are not. This design would indicate the optimal take-up rate and, if this rate is high enough, it may be able to detect the impact on outcomes relative to the control group. |
| Childcare Subsidy | The Childcare Subsidy programme is both a legal entitlement and has been available since 1983. Under these conditions, it is not possible to identify a convincing comparison group of parents who did not take up the Childcare Subsidy. It may be possible to estimate the impact of the Childcare Subsidy on non-participating parents through a Zelen RCT (ie an information campaign about the subsidy to a randomly selected group of non-participating eligible parents). Such a study would show the impact of the Childcare Subsidy on non-participating eligible parents only and not the average impact across all families using the subsidy. |
| Earthquake Support Subsidy | Because of the subsidy was paid during a natural disaster it is difficult to identify a suitable comparison group subject to similar conditions but were not eligible for the subsidy. A practical issue is that the subsidy was paid to employers and we have not yet been able to identify which individual employees received the subsidy. |
| Employment Workshop | Because of their high frequency, wide coverage and likely small impact, it was not feasible to estimate the impact of attending an individual Employment Workshop. |
| Flexible Childcare Assistance | Flexible Childcare Assistance aims to incentive eligible sole-parents to start employment during non-standard hours. But because of the low take up rate that dilutes the effect of the programme across many non-participants, we do not consider it feasible to estimate the impact of Flexible Childcare Assistance. It may be possible to estimate the impact through an invitation to treat RCT (ie an information campaign to eligible sole parents). But take up would need to be high to confidently detect any impact of Flexible Childcare Assistance through this design. |
| IB Employment Trial | We do not consider it possible to estimate the impact of the IB Employment Trial because it is subject to strong selection effects. In particular, the policy encourages people on long term health condition and disability benefits to start employment. But we are not confident we have sufficient information to separate out those who likely to move into work form those who are unable to move into employment at all. Accordingly it is difficult to identify a suitable comparison group with the same likelihood of moving into employment as the participants. |
| In Work Support | Without some type of randomised design, it is not feasible to estimate the impact of In Work Support becuase it is very difficult to identify a convincing comparison group at the same transition point into employment as the participants, but did not receive the intervention. |
| New Employment Transition Grant | Because the New Employment Transition Grant is available for people who are off main benefit and is paid out in specific circumstances it is difficult to identify a convincing comparison group to estimate the effectiveness of this grant. |
| OSCAR Provider Assistance | OSCAR Provider Assistance works indirectly to increase the supply of OSCAR providers. Currently we do not have time series information on the level or coverage of OSCAR providers to be able to identify whether the OSCAR Provider Assistance has increased the level of OSCAR services. |
| Recruitment Seminar | Because of their high frequency and likely small impact it was not feasible to estimate the impact of attending an individual Recruitment Seminar. |
| Seasonal Work Assistance | It is not currently feasible to estimate the effectiveness of this programme as it is very difficult to identify the target group (people who are thinking about moving into horticultural work) to identify whether the availability of the payment has increased movement into horticultural jobs. A secondary impact that could be examined is whether the Seasonal Work Assistance reduced the probability of horticultural workers returning to main benefit in response to poor weather before and after the introduction of the programme in 2002. |
| Supported Living Payment Opt In Service | It is currently not feasible to estimate the impact of this case management service, as we are not confident, we can identify a suitable comparison group based on the information that we can observe about those who are eligible to participate. To determine the effectiveness of this service would require some type of randomised controlled trial (RCT). |
| Sustainable Employment Trial | We do not consider it possible to estimate the impact of the Sustainable Employment Trial because it is subject to strong selection effects. In particular, the policy encourages people on long term health condition and disability benefits to start employment. But we are not confident we have sufficient information to separate out those who likely to move into work form those who are unable to move into employment at all. Accordingly it is difficult to identify a suitable comparison group with the same likelihood of moving into employment as the participants. |
| Transition to Work Grant | It is not feasible to estimate the impact of Transition to Work Grant without some type of randomised design, as it is very difficult to identify a convincing comparison group at the same transition point as the participants, but did not receive the grant. In addition, Transition to Work Grant can be paid in anticipation of an exit to work, making confounding a significant problem with this intervention. Confounding means that participation occurs in anticipation of a future outcome that is unobserved by the evaluators. |
| Work and Income Seminar | Because of their high frequency and likely small impact it was not feasible to estimate the impact of attending an individual Work and Income Seminar. |
| Work Bonus | It is not feasible to estimate the impact of Work Bonus without some type of randomised design, as it is very difficult to identify a convincing comparison group at the same transition point as the participants, but did not receive the intervention. |
| Work Focused Case Management for Young SLP | It was not feasible to estimate the impact of Work Focused Case Management for Young SLP, as we were not confident we can identify a suitable comparison group based on the information that we can observe about those who are eligible to participate. |
| Young Parent Childcare | Young Parent Childcare programme was a legal entitlement. Under these conditions it is difficult to identify a convincing comparison group of teen-parents who did not take up the Young Parent Childcare. |

## Effectiveness rating of EA interventions

Table 6 shows the results of EA interventions which have an effectiveness rating and had funding after the 2009/2010 financial year. Alongside each intervention, the table provides the intervention’s current rating (rate), the method used to estimate the intervention’s effectiveness (mthd) and the impact against each of the main outcome domains we based the rating on.

The right side of the table shows the impact of the intervention on each of the main outcome domains listed above, with the specific outcome measure given in brackets as a code. The description of each outcome measure is given at the end of the table. As discussed in the main part of the report, there are two impact estimates:

* **Observed**: is the directly measured impact over the period that we can measure each outcome over.
* **Projected**: this is the estimated long-term impact of the intervention based on the observed trend in the impact. The projected impact is particularly important where we have only short-term impacts (ie under five years) that understate the likely true long term impact of the intervention.

For each impact, the table provides the impact estimate, an \* where the impact estimate is significantly above or below zero and the period from participation start that the impact was measured over.

If the outcome is not shown in the Impact by Outcome Domain column, then it is not currently available for that intervention and accordingly not used in assessing its effectiveness. The results in Table 6 are for all participants over the entire operation of the intervention and, therefore, will not necessarily match that reported in the main part of the report.

Table 6: Effectiveness rating and impact by outcome domain for interventions funded since 2010/2011

| Intervention | Outcome | Observed | Projected |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Activity in the Community(rate:Likely negative, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | 8.00 wks@7.9 yrs | 12.0 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | $278 @7.9 yrs | -$7,218 @25.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 0.28 wks@7.9 yrs | -0.40 wks@24.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.10 nqf@6.9 yrs | \*0.15 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*$5,787 @7.9 yrs | \*$12,233 @25.6 yrs |
| Be Your Own Boss(rate:Likely negative, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | -6.90 wks@7.9 yrs | -28.0 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*-$20,078 @7.9 yrs | \*-$45,345 @25.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -0.14 wks@7.9 yrs | -0.51 wks@24.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.20 nqf@6.9 yrs | \*0.79 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | -$1,120 @7.9 yrs | -$7,338 @25.6 yrs |
| Business Training And Advice Grant(rate:Negative, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | 0.50 wks@7.9 yrs | -20.0 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*-$18,259 @7.9 yrs | \*-$48,665 @25.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -2.49 wks@7.9 yrs | -0.73 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.01 nqf@6.9 yrs | 0.00 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | -$5,564 @7.9 yrs | -$1,035 @25.6 yrs |
| Careers Guidance and Counselling(rate:Mixed, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*4.90 wks@3.9 yrs | 16.0 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | $865 @3.9 yrs | -$8,569 @25.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -0.60 wks@3.9 yrs | -3.04 wks@24.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.04 nqf@3 yrs | \*0.13 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*$2,477 @3.9 yrs | $3,604 @25.6 yrs |
| Case Management Initiative(rate:Too soon to rate, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*2.90 wks@2 yrs | -6.20 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | -$350 @2 yrs | \*-$14,621 @25.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -0.13 wks@2 yrs | -5.17 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.01 nqf@1 yr | -0.04 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $631 @2 yrs | \*$8,973 @25.6 yrs |
| CommunityMax(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*20.0 wks@8.4 yrs | \*-105.0 wks@39.5 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | -$3,778 @8.4 yrs | -$8,390 @19.2 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 2.36 wks@8.4 yrs | 4.01 wks@21.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.00 nqf@7.9 yrs | -0.00 nqf@7.9 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$5,005 @8.4 yrs | -$6,496 @19.2 yrs |
| Course Participation Assistance(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*20.0 wks@11.8 yrs | \*23.0 wks@28.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$7,967 @11.8 yrs | $8,973 @28.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 1.43 wks@11.8 yrs | 2.00 wks@28.6 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.02 nqf@11.8 yrs | 0.03 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | -$659 @11.8 yrs | -$2,624 @28.6 yrs |
| Employment Participation and Inclusion services(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*15.0 wks@2.5 yrs | \*15.0 wks@2.5 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$3,284 @2.5 yrs | \*$3,284 @2.5 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -0.40 wks@2.2 yrs | -0.40 wks@2.2 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.00 nqf@2 yrs | -0.00 nqf@2 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | -$232 @2.5 yrs | -$232 @2.5 yrs |
| Employment Placement or Assistance Initiative(rate:Promising, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*9.50 wks@2 yrs | \*16.0 wks@22.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | $1,270 @2 yrs | \*-$18,395 @21.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | \*-1.70 wks@2 yrs | -5.74 wks@22.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | \*0.11 nqf@1 yr | \*0.13 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$1,212 @2 yrs | \*-$10,642 @22.7 yrs |
| Enterprise Allowance(rate:Mixed, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | 0.80 wks@8.4 yrs | -13.0 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*-$22,836 @8.4 yrs | -$38,885 @25.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -0.71 wks@8.4 yrs | 0.52 wks@22.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.01 nqf@7.4 yrs | 0.00 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$15,415 @8.4 yrs | \*-$24,432 @25.6 yrs |
| Flexi-Wage Self-Employment(rate:Negative, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | -14.0 wks@3.9 yrs | -34.0 wks@14.8 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*-$23,820 @3.9 yrs | -$39,512 @14.8 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 1.32 wks@3.9 yrs | 3.18 wks@14.8 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.12 nqf@3 yrs | -0.16 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | -$8,439 @3.9 yrs | -$8,754 @9.9 yrs |
| Flexi-wage(rate:Promising, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*28.0 wks@2 yrs | \*62.0 wks@17.3 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$6,227 @2 yrs | \*$13,211 @15.8 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 0.02 wks@2 yrs | -3.29 wks@15.3 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.04 nqf@1 yr | \*-0.09 nqf@6.9 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$7,816 @2 yrs | \*-$25,299 @20.7 yrs |
| Foundation Focused Training(rate:Mixed, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*5.40 wks@5.7 yrs | \*5.40 wks@5.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*-$3,884 @5.7 yrs | \*-$3,884 @5.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 0.15 wks@5.4 yrs | 0.15 wks@5.4 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.06 nqf@4.9 yrs | \*0.16 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $752 @5.7 yrs | $752 @5.7 yrs |
| Health Interventions(rate:No difference, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | 7.30 wks@11.8 yrs | 1.90 wks@22.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | $927 @11.8 yrs | $2,560 @22.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -3.78 wks@11.8 yrs | -4.31 wks@22.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.20 nqf@10.8 yrs | 0.20 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $5,727 @11.8 yrs | $9,470 @22.7 yrs |
| In-Work Support (IWS) trial(rate:No difference, mthd:RCT) | Welfare (OBN) | 1.20 wks@34.9 yrs | 1.20 wks@34.9 yrs |
| Job For A Local(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*67.0 wks@7.9 yrs | \*234.0 wks@39.5 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | $34,766 @7.9 yrs | $38,278 @17.8 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -5.51 wks@7.9 yrs | -6.15 wks@14.3 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.31 nqf@7.4 yrs | -0.31 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | -$13,082 @7.9 yrs | -$54,396 @39.5 yrs |
| Job Opportunities with Training(rate:Mixed, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*38.0 wks@7.9 yrs | \*43.0 wks@18.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$17,162 @7.9 yrs | $21,178 @18.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -0.63 wks@7.9 yrs | -0.51 wks@18.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | \*-0.21 nqf@6.9 yrs | \*-0.21 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$6,886 @7.9 yrs | -$9,678 @18.7 yrs |
| Job Ops(rate:Mixed, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*42.0 wks@8.4 yrs | \*54.0 wks@22.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$20,312 @8.4 yrs | \*$75,659 @39.5 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 0.86 wks@8.4 yrs | 1.33 wks@19.2 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | \*-0.40 nqf@7.9 yrs | \*-1.06 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$6,379 @8.4 yrs | \*-$23,933 @39.5 yrs |
| Job Preparation Programme(rate:Promising, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | 4.60 wks@5.9 yrs | \*23.0 wks@18.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | -$1,925 @5.9 yrs | -$1,680 @18.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 0.49 wks@5.9 yrs | -1.20 wks@18.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.10 nqf@4.9 yrs | 0.10 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $379 @5.9 yrs | -$4,687 @18.7 yrs |
| Job Search Initiatives(rate:Promising, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*5.20 wks@2.5 yrs | -2.50 wks@39.5 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | $271 @2.5 yrs | \*-$29,537 @39.5 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -0.11 wks@2.2 yrs | -2.50 wks@39.5 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.06 nqf@2 yrs | 0.00 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $467 @2.5 yrs | $1,425 @29.6 yrs |
| Jobs With A Future(rate:No difference, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | -34.0 wks@9.9 yrs | -56.0 wks@20.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | -$15,072 @9.9 yrs | -$24,118 @20.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 4.98 wks@9.9 yrs | 5.44 wks@20.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.08 nqf@8.9 yrs | 0.06 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $4,295 @9.9 yrs | $5,201 @20.7 yrs |
| Jobseeker Support Work Ready 52-week benefit reapplication(rate:Effective, mthd:PreP) | Welfare (OBN) | \*5.80 wks@1.9 yrs | \*6.00 wks@7.7 yrs |
| Limited Services Volunteer(rate:Mixed, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*6.30 wks@2.7 yrs | \*44.0 wks@21.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$3,217 @2.7 yrs | \*$16,428 @21.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -2.05 wks@2.5 yrs | -5.65 wks@18.2 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | \*-0.11 nqf@2 yrs | \*-0.14 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $33 @2.7 yrs | -$4,639 @21.7 yrs |
| Literacy/Numeracy(rate:No difference, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | -25.0 wks@7.9 yrs | -26.0 wks@14.3 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | -$6,370 @7.9 yrs | -$4,504 @18.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -12.6 wks@7.9 yrs | -21.2 wks@18.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.09 nqf@6.9 yrs | 0.00 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $13,527 @7.9 yrs | $16,787 @18.7 yrs |
| Local Industry Partnerships(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*20.0 wks@7.9 yrs | 20.0 wks@19.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | $7,263 @7.9 yrs | $2,590 @22.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -5.48 wks@7.9 yrs | -8.30 wks@22.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.10 nqf@6.9 yrs | 0.05 nqf@10.8 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | -$2,694 @7.9 yrs | -$5,137 @22.7 yrs |
| Mana in Mahi(rate:Too soon to rate, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*21.0 wks@1 yr | 26.0 wks@7.2 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$7,763 @1 yr | $10,764 @7.9 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -5.22 wks@1 yr | \*-34.8 wks@11.8 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.09 nqf@0 yrs | 0.09 nqf@0 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$4,290 @1 yr | -$6,551 @7.9 yrs |
| Mental Health Employment Service Trial(rate:Effective, mthd:RCT) | Welfare (ONN) | \*-1.11 wks@3.2 yrs | \*-1.90 wks@10.5 yrs |
| NA(rate:Effective, mthd:RCT) | Welfare (ONN) | \*-11.2 wks@2 yrs | \*-21.1 wks@7.4 yrs |
| NA(rate:No difference, mthd:RCT) | Welfare (ONN) | \*-11.2 wks@2 yrs | \*-21.1 wks@7.4 yrs |
| NA(rate:Not feasible, mthd:RCT) | Welfare (ONN) | \*-11.2 wks@2 yrs | \*-21.1 wks@7.4 yrs |
| NA(rate:Not rated, mthd:RCT) | Welfare (ONN) | \*-11.2 wks@2 yrs | \*-21.1 wks@7.4 yrs |
| New Initiative(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*7.90 wks@2 yrs | \*35.0 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$1,885 @2 yrs | $3,337 @25.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 1.00 wks@2 yrs | 3.82 wks@24.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.03 nqf@1 yr | 0.02 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | -$817 @2 yrs | -$2,115 @23.7 yrs |
| New Zealand Conservation Corps(rate:Negative, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | -7.90 wks@7.9 yrs | -1.80 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | -$7,867 @7.9 yrs | -$5,915 @24.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | \*10.9 wks@7.9 yrs | 16.5 wks@23.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.01 nqf@6.9 yrs | \*-0.84 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $4,460 @7.9 yrs | \*$14,195 @25.6 yrs |
| PATHS(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*11.0 wks@3.9 yrs | \*46.0 wks@22.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | $1,963 @4.2 yrs | -$4,923 @22.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -0.30 wks@3.9 yrs | -1.15 wks@21.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.10 nqf@3 yrs | 0.00 nqf@26.6 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | -$244 @4.2 yrs | \*-$13,397 @22.7 yrs |
| Skills for Growth(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*48.0 wks@7.9 yrs | 58.0 wks@18.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$40,273 @7.9 yrs | \*$55,192 @18.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 0.82 wks@7.9 yrs | 0.61 wks@18.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.21 nqf@6.9 yrs | -0.18 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$8,922 @7.9 yrs | -$12,363 @18.7 yrs |
| Skills for Industry(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*17.0 wks@2 yrs | \*73.0 wks@18.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$3,472 @2 yrs | \*$20,053 @18.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -0.87 wks@2 yrs | -3.64 wks@18.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.06 nqf@1 yr | 0.00 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$3,391 @2 yrs | \*-$18,788 @18.7 yrs |
| Skills Investment(rate:Promising, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*52.0 wks@8.4 yrs | \*70.0 wks@23.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$12,583 @8.4 yrs | \*$24,029 @22.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -0.11 wks@8.4 yrs | -0.81 wks@22.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.03 nqf@7.4 yrs | \*-0.11 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$14,400 @8.4 yrs | \*-$18,467 @21.7 yrs |
| Skills Training(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*12.0 wks@7.9 yrs | 7.70 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | -$209 @7.9 yrs | -$7,379 @25.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 2.55 wks@7.9 yrs | 3.28 wks@23.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.03 nqf@6.9 yrs | \*0.11 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | -$1,807 @7.9 yrs | $662 @25.6 yrs |
| Sole Parent Employment Service Trial(rate:Effective, mthd:RCT) | Welfare (ONN) | \*-7.20 wks@3.2 yrs | \*-10.1 wks@14.4 yrs |
| Sole Parent Support Study Assistance(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | 9.20 wks@7.4 yrs | 15.0 wks@18.2 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | $12,124 @7.4 yrs | $18,830 @18.2 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 3.35 wks@7.4 yrs | 6.22 wks@18.2 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | \*0.99 nqf@6.9 yrs | \*2.42 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $4,178 @7.4 yrs | $2,744 @18.2 yrs |
| Straight 2 Work(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*32.0 wks@7.9 yrs | \*36.0 wks@20.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$10,590 @7.9 yrs | \*-$64,532 @39.5 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 0.26 wks@7.9 yrs | \*-33.0 wks@39.5 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.00 nqf@7.4 yrs | \*0.58 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$4,683 @7.9 yrs | \*-$4,552 @17.8 yrs |
| Taskforce Green(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*46.0 wks@8.4 yrs | \*55.0 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | $2,953 @8.4 yrs | $44 @25.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -2.15 wks@8.4 yrs | -4.17 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.10 nqf@7.4 yrs | \*0.13 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$9,329 @8.4 yrs | -$9,610 @25.6 yrs |
| Training for Work(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*11.0 wks@2 yrs | \*64.0 wks@26.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$1,724 @2 yrs | \*$9,910 @18.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -0.40 wks@2 yrs | -1.82 wks@18.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.05 nqf@1 yr | 0.00 nqf@9.7 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$1,680 @2 yrs | \*-$15,787 @19.2 yrs |
| Training Incentive Allowance(rate:Mixed, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | -1.20 wks@2.5 yrs | \*58.0 wks@29.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$6,186 @2.5 yrs | \*$32,550 @28.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -0.23 wks@2.2 yrs | -2.48 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | \*0.83 nqf@2 yrs | \*1.27 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*$7,615 @2.5 yrs | -$6,581 @28.6 yrs |
| Training Opportunities(rate:Mixed, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | 7.60 wks@9.9 yrs | -2.00 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | -$5,295 @9.9 yrs | \*-$16,832 @28.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 0.01 wks@9.9 yrs | -2.07 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.06 nqf@8.9 yrs | \*0.06 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $2,094 @9.9 yrs | $5,806 @25.6 yrs |
| Vacancy Placement Full time(rate:Too soon to rate, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*15.0 wks@2 yrs | \*32.0 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$3,520 @2 yrs | $6,716 @25.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | \*1.19 wks@2 yrs | 4.12 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.02 nqf@1 yr | -0.00 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$2,595 @2 yrs | -$2,218 @25.6 yrs |
| Vacancy Placement Part time(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*16.0 wks@2 yrs | \*65.0 wks@21.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$2,738 @2 yrs | $5,770 @25.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 0.26 wks@2 yrs | 3.42 wks@24.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.01 nqf@1 yr | \*0.08 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*-$1,076 @2 yrs | \*-$6,485 @25.6 yrs |
| Vocational Services Employment(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*15.0 wks@2.5 yrs | \*15.0 wks@2.5 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$3,284 @2.5 yrs | \*$3,284 @2.5 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -0.40 wks@2.2 yrs | -0.40 wks@2.2 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.00 nqf@2 yrs | 0.00 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | -$232 @2.5 yrs | -$232 @2.5 yrs |
| Work Ability Assessment(rate:Too soon to rate, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | -1.00 wks@2 yrs | -25.0 wks@14.8 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | -$719 @2 yrs | -$3,144 @14.8 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -1.04 wks@2 yrs | -3.02 wks@14.8 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.01 nqf@1 yr | -0.01 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $1,841 @2 yrs | -$785 @14.8 yrs |
| Work Confidence(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*9.10 wks@5.9 yrs | 13.0 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | -$2,188 @5.9 yrs | -$1,268 @26.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 0.57 wks@5.9 yrs | -0.38 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.02 nqf@4.9 yrs | -0.03 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | -$1,379 @5.9 yrs | $3,371 @25.6 yrs |
| Work Experience(rate:Effective, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | \*18.0 wks@5.9 yrs | 6.10 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | \*$8,918 @5.9 yrs | $11,086 @25.6 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 1.43 wks@5.9 yrs | 1.88 wks@25.6 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.10 nqf@4.9 yrs | 0.05 nqf@14.8 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | -$1,090 @5.9 yrs | $1,221 @25.6 yrs |
| Work Preparation Services(rate:No difference, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | 4.60 wks@5.9 yrs | 4.60 wks@5.9 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | -$1,925 @5.9 yrs | -$1,925 @5.9 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 0.49 wks@5.9 yrs | 0.49 wks@5.9 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.10 nqf@4.9 yrs | 0.10 nqf@4.9 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $379 @5.9 yrs | $379 @5.9 yrs |
| Work to Wellness(rate:Promising, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | 3.70 wks@2 yrs | -12.0 wks@10.8 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | $864 @2 yrs | -$2,377 @9.9 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -2.41 wks@2 yrs | -9.66 wks@14.8 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | 0.09 nqf@1 yr | \*0.86 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $886 @2 yrs | $358 @14.8 yrs |
| WRK4U(rate:Effective, mthd:DID) | Welfare (OBN) | \*16.0 wks@2 yrs | 17.0 wks@7.7 yrs |
| Youth Service (NEET)(rate:Likely negative, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | -0.30 wks@3.2 yrs | \*-21.0 wks@16.8 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | $404 @3.2 yrs | -$6,372 @16.8 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | -0.20 wks@3.2 yrs | -1.08 wks@16.3 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.05 nqf@3 yrs | 0.00 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $107 @3.2 yrs | $2,403 @16.8 yrs |
| Youth Service (YP)(rate:Promising, mthd:PM T) | Employment (EMP) | 5.10 wks@2.4 yrs | 10.0 wks@12.9 yrs |
| Welfare (OBN) | -0.80 wks@2.4 yrs | \*16.0 wks@12.3 yrs |
| Youth Service (YPP)(rate:No difference, mthd:PM T) | Employment (EMP) | 8.40 wks@2.4 yrs | 13.0 wks@12.9 yrs |
| Welfare (OBN) | 0.90 wks@2.4 yrs | 19.0 wks@12.8 yrs |
| Youth Training(rate:Negative, mthd:PM) | Employment (EMP) | -14.0 wks@7.9 yrs | -14.0 wks@22.7 yrs |
| Income (IAN) | -$1,209 @7.9 yrs | $9,903 @21.7 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 10.7 wks@7.9 yrs | 11.7 wks@22.7 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.11 nqf@6.9 yrs | \*-1.14 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | \*$7,244 @7.9 yrs | $14,714 @21.7 yrs |
| Youth Transitions Services(rate:Negative, mthd:PM) | Income (IAN) | -$9,563 @11.3 yrs | -$9,563 @11.3 yrs |
| Justice (COA) | 11.5 wks@11.3 yrs | 11.5 wks@11.3 yrs |
| Qualifications (NQA) | -0.42 nqf@10.8 yrs | \*-2.27 nqf@39.5 yrs |
| Welfare (ISI) | $2,645 @11.3 yrs | $2,645 @11.3 yrs |
| NQA-Average of highest NQF level achieved: For each person identify the highest NQF level awarded and calculate the average for the group. NQF levels start from 1 (year 11) through to 9 (PhD). |
| EMP-In any employment: Employment is based on tax data (PAYE and annual tax returns). Periods with less than $100 of employment income per month are excluded. |
| IAN-Net income from all sources: Income includes taxable earnings, taxable and non-taxable income support payments including tax credits and pensions (but excluding recoverable assistance) and student allowance payments net of income tax. |
| OBN-Off main benefit: A person is no longer receiving a main benefit. |
| ISI-Income Support expenditure: Income includes taxable and non-taxable income support payments including tax credits and pensions (but excluding recoverable assistance) net of income tax. |
| ONN-On main benefit: A person is receiving a main benefit or pension based on IR PAYE records, value of less then $100 in a month are excluded. |
| COA-Time in any corrections service: Corrections services include prison, community sentence home detention. |
| Impact method: RCT: Randomised Control Trial, PM: Propensity score matching, PM T: Propensity score matching with differences in differences, PreP: Pre-post comparison, DiD: Differences in Differences. |
| \*: impact is significant at the 95% confidence interval. |
|  |
| Source: Ministry of Social Development & Statistics New Zealand Integrated Data Infrastructure, June 2021. |

## Effectiveness rating by financial year

The accompanying csv file to this report (2021\_ea\_effectiveness\_fy21.csv) provides the impact and outcome estimates contained in this report. The csv file has the following columns:

* **ProgrammeName**: name of the intervention
* **Period**: the financial years (starting in July) the participants started the intervention. If the period value is *All* then the results cover all participants in the intervention.
* **Outcome domain**: the general domain the outcome and associated impact cover.
* **Outcome**: name of the outcome.
* **OutcomeDescription**: a brief description of the outcome and how it is measured.
* **OutcomeMetric**: the metric the outcome is expressed in (eg wks for weeks).
* **ObservedLapsePeriod**: the number of years from participation start that outcomes are measured over. This will vary depending on the outcome owing to differences in the lag collection of the data in each agency and the supply of this information to the SNZ IDI.
* **ObservedOutcome**: observed outcome of the participant group at the end of the observed lapse period.
* **ObservedOutcomeCI**: 95% confidence interval for the observed outcome.
* **ObservedOutcomeVariance**: variance in the observed outcomes of the participants for calculating effect sizes.
* **ImpactDescription**: description of the impact measure.
* **ObservedImpact**: projected impact based on the trend in the observed impact.
* **ObservedImpactCI**: 95% confidence interval for the projected impact.
* **ProjectedLapsePeriod**: the period the projected outcomes are measured over.
* **ProjectedImpact**: projected impact based on the trend in the observed impact.
* **ProjectedImpactCI**: 95% confidence interval for the projected impact.
* **ParticipantN**: unweighted number of participants.
* **ComparisonN**: unweighted number in the comparison group.
* **Method**: impact method, RCT: Randomised Control Trial, PM: Propensity score matching, PM T: A propensity score matching with differences in differences, PreP: Pre-post comparison, DiD: Differences in Differences.

# Appendix 2: Cost of EA interventions

Working out the full cost of EA interventions is not straightforward. While some costs can be easily identified, such as contract payments or subsidy amounts, others are more difficult to determine. Examples of the latter include the cost of making a referral, setting up a vacancy placement or the time staff spend in referring people to programmes.

MSD operates an individualised Cost Allocation Model (iCAM) to estimate the cost of the individual outputs delivered by MSD, including EA interventions (MSD, 2017). We define outputs as “any activity or service delivered to individuals”. For example, an output can be a seminar or a grant of a main benefit.

In brief, the iCAM splits the cost of each output into a set of cost components (components are defined as specific tasks that are involved in delivering an output). For example, a wage subsidy placement would include five components: referral, vacancy placement, subsidy amount, subsidy administration and indirect costs. The iCAM allocates the costs to each of these components based on financial and output information and the sum is the full cost of the wage subsidy placement. At present the iCAM includes MSD costs only and it does not include costs of partner organisations (eg police, corrections) involved with several EA interventions such as Limited Services Volunteer.

Currently, we update the iCAM every financial year. In these updates, we include additional expenditure and outputs of the new financial year, but we also make updates to the process of allocating costs based on better information or a better understanding of where costs should be allocated. Any changes to the cost-allocation model itself are applied to all financial years from 2001/2002 onwards to ensure comparability of results over time. However, this retrospective updating of cost allocations means it is not possible to compare individual EA intervention costs between annual reports.

The accompanying csv file (2021\_ea\_intervention\_expenditure\_fy21.csv) provides data on the estimated cost of each intervention covered in this report by financial year. The file has the following columns:

* **Programme**: name of the intervention
* **FinancialYear**: the financial year the expenditure relates to. Financial years start in July.
* **CostType**: costs are split into direct and indirect costs. Indirect costs are the share of agency fixed costs allocated to the intervention based on staff costs.
* **Expenditure**: total expenditure in nominal dollars (ie not adjusted for inflation).
* **ParticipantStarts**: number of participant starts over the financial year from which a simple cost per start can be calculated.

# Appendix 3: Effectiveness expenditure trends

The following tables break down the trends in the expenditure for each of the effectiveness ratings by intervention type for the last five financial years. The table shows the annual change in expenditure from the baseline year (2015/2016).

### Interventions with an effectiveness rating

Table 7 shows the change in expenditure for interventions with an effectiveness rating. Since 2015/2016 there has been a decrease in expenditure in this category. The decrease has in large part been driven by declines in expenditure on interventions such as Training for Work, Flexi-wage (Basic/Plus) ,Vacancy placements (work brokerage) and Youth Service (NEET).

Table 7: Change in expenditure on EA interventions with an effectiveness rating

| Intervention | 15/16 | 16/17 | 17/18 | 18/19 | 19/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Baseline | Change relative to baseline |
| Activity in the Community | $0.3 | $0.1 | $0.7 | $1.0 | $0.7 |
| Course Participation Assistance | $2.7 | $-0.3 | $0.3 | $0.7 | $0.4 |
| Employment Participation and Inclusion services | $0.0 | $31.4 | $34.9 | $31.1 | $29.6 |
| Employment Placement or Assistance Initiative | $21.5 | $8.6 | $8.1 | $-0.9 | $3.0 |
| Flexi-wage | $34.1 | $-4.4 | $-2.5 | $-5.9 | $-9.5 |
| Flexi-Wage Self-Employment | $0.6 | $1.4 | $1.3 | $1.3 | $1.5 |
| Health Interventions | $1.3 | $-0.1 | $-0.2 | $-1.0 | $-1.0 |
| Job Search Initiatives | $5.1 | $-1.4 | $0.0 | $6.2 | $2.2 |
| Jobseeker Support Work Ready 52-week benefit reapplication | $8.3 | $-0.8 | $0.9 | $1.2 | $0.0 |
| Limited Services Volunteer | $4.9 | $0.9 | $-4.8 | $-4.8 | $4.7 |
| Mental Health Employment Service Trial | $3.2 | $-3.2 | $-3.2 | $-3.2 | $-3.2 |
| New Initiative | $1.3 | $-0.4 | $-0.1 | $4.6 | $4.5 |
| PATHS | $1.0 | $-1.0 | $-0.9 | $-0.9 | $-1.0 |
| Skills for Industry | $15.9 | $5.9 | $6.6 | $15.3 | $24.2 |
| Sole Parent Employment Service Trial | $2.8 | $-1.2 | $-2.8 | $-2.8 | $-2.8 |
| Training for Work | $29.7 | $-12.9 | $-15.4 | $-21.7 | $-24.3 |
| Training Incentive Allowance | $2.2 | $-0.6 | $-0.8 | $-0.9 | $-1.1 |
| Vacancy Placement Full time | $18.2 | $-3.4 | $-1.2 | $-1.7 | $-1.9 |
| Vacancy Placement Part time | $3.4 | $0.0 | $-0.2 | $-0.3 | $-0.7 |
| Vocational Services Employment | $31.6 | $-31.6 | $-31.6 | $-31.6 | $-31.6 |
| Work Confidence | $2.9 | $-1.8 | $3.2 | $2.9 | $-1.9 |
| Work to Wellness | $0.0 | $1.9 | $1.5 | $1.7 | $1.4 |
| WRK4U | $4.2 | $-0.4 | $-0.6 | $-1.1 | $-3.7 |
| Youth Service (NEET) | $21.6 | $-5.2 | $-5.7 | $-6.2 | $-6.2 |
| Youth Service (YP) | $10.4 | $-0.0 | $-1.9 | $-2.4 | $-1.1 |
| Youth Service (YPP) | $4.7 | $1.0 | $1.7 | $1.2 | $1.6 |
| **Total** | **$234.3** | **$-16.9** | **$-11.9** | **$-17.2** | **$-15.9** |
| Dollars are nominal and expressed in millions of dollars. Only showing interventions with more than $1 million of expenditure in any of the financial years shown in the table.Source: Ministry of Social Development & Statistics New Zealand Integrated Data Infrastructure, June 2021. |

### Not rated interventions

Table 8 shows the change in expenditure for interventions without an effectiveness rating. There was a noticeable increase in not rated interventions in 2016/2016 that corresponded to the temporary introduction of the Earthquake Support Subsidy as well as a large increase in Childcare subsidy payments. The fall in expenditure in 2019/2020 can be explained by the reduction in Childcare Subsidy use during the COVID lock down period from March to June 2020.

Table 8: Change in expenditure on EA interventions without an effectiveness rating

| Intervention | 15/16 | 16/17 | 17/18 | 18/19 | 19/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Baseline | Change relative to baseline |
| $5k to Work | $0.0 | $4.1 | $3.5 | $3.1 | $2.9 |
| Childcare Subsidy | $182.2 | $16.4 | $13.9 | $0.5 | $-36.9 |
| Earthquake Support Subsidy | $0.0 | $17.5 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 |
| Flexi-wage Project in the Community | $0.3 | $1.3 | $1.5 | $1.7 | $1.4 |
| Jobseeker Support Health Condition or Disability 52-week reapplication | $5.2 | $-0.6 | $-0.6 | $-1.4 | $-2.3 |
| Mainstream Employment Programme | $0.6 | $2.5 | $3.2 | $3.2 | $1.9 |
| Mana in Mahi | $0.0 | $0.0 | $0.0 | $2.9 | $6.9 |
| Oranga Mahi - REACH | $0.0 | $0.3 | $0.1 | $0.1 | $1.1 |
| OSCAR Provider Assistance | $18.1 | $-0.3 | $0.9 | $0.3 | $2.9 |
| Regional Economic Development | $0.0 | $0.6 | $2.2 | $1.7 | $1.8 |
| Sole Parent Support 52-week reapplication | $1.5 | $6.7 | $6.1 | $4.2 | $2.9 |
| Transition to Work Grant | $19.6 | $0.8 | $1.3 | $-0.1 | $-0.0 |
| Work Bonus | $2.8 | $-1.0 | $-0.8 | $-1.1 | $-1.3 |
|  | $2.9 | $-2.9 | $-2.9 | $-2.9 | $-2.9 |
| **Total** | **$237.3** | **$46.9** | **$30.9** | **$13.4** | **$-20.2** |
| Dollars are nominal and expressed in millions of dollars. Only showing interventions with more than $1 million of expenditure in any of the financial years shown in the table.Source: Ministry of Social Development & Statistics New Zealand Integrated Data Infrastructure, June 2021. |

### Effective and promising interventions

Table 9 shows the change in expenditure for interventions rated as effective or promising. Funding for a number of effective interventions decreased in 2018/2019, specifically Training for Work, Flexi-Wage (basic/Plus) and Vacancy placement. In addition, the WRK4U intervention ended in October 2019. The larger fall in expenditure on effective and promising interventions in 2019/2020 can, in part be, explained by the COVID lock down period from March to June 2020 limiting the delivery of active employment assistance.

Table 9: Change in expenditure on EA interventions rated effective or promising

| Intervention | 15/16 | 16/17 | 17/18 | 18/19 | 19/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Baseline | Change relative to baseline |
| Employment Participation and Inclusion services | $0.0 | $31.4 | $34.9 | $31.1 | $29.6 |
| Employment Placement or Assistance Initiative | $21.5 | $8.6 | $8.1 | $-0.9 | $3.0 |
| Flexi-wage | $34.1 | $-4.4 | $-2.5 | $-5.9 | $-9.5 |
| Job Search Initiatives | $5.1 | $-1.4 | $0.0 | $6.2 | $2.2 |
| Jobseeker Support Work Ready 52-week benefit reapplication | $8.3 | $-0.8 | $0.9 | $1.2 | $0.0 |
| Mental Health Employment Service Trial | $3.2 | $-3.2 | $-3.2 | $-3.2 | $-3.2 |
| Skills for Industry | $15.9 | $5.9 | $6.6 | $15.3 | $24.2 |
| Sole Parent Employment Service Trial | $2.8 | $-1.2 | $-2.8 | $-2.8 | $-2.8 |
| Training for Work | $29.7 | $-12.9 | $-15.4 | $-21.7 | $-24.3 |
| Training Incentive Allowance | $2.2 | $-0.6 | $-0.8 | $-0.9 | $-1.1 |
| Vacancy Placement Full time | $18.2 | $-3.4 | $-1.2 | $-1.7 | $-1.9 |
| Vacancy Placement Part time | $3.4 | $0.0 | $-0.2 | $-0.3 | $-0.7 |
| Vocational Services Employment | $31.6 | $-31.6 | $-31.6 | $-31.6 | $-31.6 |
| Work Confidence | $2.9 | $-1.8 | $3.2 | $2.9 | $-1.9 |
| Work to Wellness | $0.0 | $1.9 | $1.5 | $1.7 | $1.4 |
| WRK4U | $4.2 | $-0.4 | $-0.6 | $-1.1 | $-3.7 |
| Youth Service (YP) | $10.4 | $-0.0 | $-1.9 | $-2.4 | $-1.1 |
| **Total** | **$193.8** | **$-13.9** | **$-5.1** | **$-14.2** | **$-21.5** |
| Dollars are nominal and expressed in millions of dollars. Only showing interventions with more than $1 million of expenditure in any of the financial years shown in the table.Source: Ministry of Social Development & Statistics New Zealand Integrated Data Infrastructure, June 2021. |

### Mixed, no-difference and negative interventions

Table 10 shows the change in expenditure for interventions rated as either mixed, no difference, likely negative or negative effectiveness rating. The overall trend is a reduction in expenditure on interventions in this group. The largest reduction has occurred for Youth Service (NEET) followed by the ending of the two trials (Sole Parent and Mental Health Employment Services).

Table 10: Change in expenditure on EA interventions rated as having mixed, no-difference or negative rating

| Intervention | 15/16 | 16/17 | 17/18 | 18/19 | 19/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Baseline | Change relative to baseline |
| Activity in the Community | $0.3 | $0.1 | $0.7 | $1.0 | $0.7 |
| Course Participation Assistance | $2.7 | $-0.3 | $0.3 | $0.7 | $0.4 |
| Flexi-Wage Self-Employment | $0.6 | $1.4 | $1.3 | $1.3 | $1.5 |
| Health Interventions | $1.3 | $-0.1 | $-0.2 | $-1.0 | $-1.0 |
| Limited Services Volunteer | $4.9 | $0.9 | $-4.8 | $-4.8 | $4.7 |
| New Initiative | $1.3 | $-0.4 | $-0.1 | $4.6 | $4.5 |
| PATHS | $1.0 | $-1.0 | $-0.9 | $-0.9 | $-1.0 |
| Youth Service (NEET) | $21.6 | $-5.2 | $-5.7 | $-6.2 | $-6.2 |
| Youth Service (YPP) | $4.7 | $1.0 | $1.7 | $1.2 | $1.6 |
| **Total** | **$40.6** | **$-3.0** | **$-6.8** | **$-3.0** | **$5.7** |
| Dollars are nominal and expressed in millions of dollars. Only showing interventions with more than $1 million of expenditure in any of the financial years shown in the table.Source: Ministry of Social Development & Statistics New Zealand Integrated Data Infrastructure, June 2021. |

# Appendix 4: Intervention descriptions

Table 11 provides a brief description of each of the interventions included in this review with over $1 million dollars of expenditure for at least one financial year. While we attempt to have a complete description as possible, we were not always able to find detailed documentation for all interventions.

Table 11: Description of EA interventions funded between 2010/2011 and 2019/2020

| Intervention description |
| --- |
| **$5k to Work (2015-)** |
| $5k to Work is a non-taxable $5,000 incentive payment for applicants who need to relocate to secure full-time employment lasting at least 91 days. The payment is non-recoverable in most circumstances. The payment is recoverable when participants cease employment without good and sufficient reason within 91 days or the payment wasn't used for the purpose for which it was paid (e.g. did not relocate or start work). Individuals are ineligible for $5k to Work if they have received the payment within the last 52 weeks. |
| **Activity in the Community (2001-)** |
| Activity in the Community projects offer participants on non-work obligated benefits the opportunity to gain unpaid work experience in a community organisation. Participants remain on benefit and receive a small additional payment to cover any costs associated with participating in the programme. Placements are no more than 26 weeks during any 52 week period. |
| **CadetMax (2008-)** |
| CadetMax is a programme where young people in South Auckland are given job-specific training to place them into an identified job. In addition to training, the programme also emphasises mentoring and helping participants identify their career goals. The target group are people on income support aged 18 to 24 years. |
| **Childcare Subsidy (1983-)** |
| Childcare Subsidy is a non-taxable payment that aims to assist low-income families with dependent children to undertake and remain in employment, education or training. Most people are eligible to receive up to nine hours of subsidised payments a week, but some can qualify for up to 50 hours if they are in full-time training or employment. |
| **CommunityMax (2009-2011)** |
| Community Max was a subsidised community-based work experience programme. CommunityMax targeted people aged 18 to 24 years on main benefits. The subsidy was equivalent to the minimum wage, lasted for six months and could cover the costs of supervision and training. While on CommunityMax, participants spent up to 30 hours a week helping complete community-based projects and preparing for further opportunities in the workforce. To receive Community Max funding, the project had to be of benefit to the community, not displace existing staff or contractors, be additional to the normal work of the organisation, and be non-commercial. |
| **Course Participation Assistance (2007-)** |
| The Course Participation Assistance (CPA) provides a grant of up to $1,000 over a 52 week period to assist beneficiaries to participate in training and work-related skills development. Applicants must have been receiving a benefit (or granted a benefit and subject to the initial stand down) or be a non-qualified spouse of a recipient of New Zealand Superannuation or a Veteran's Pension, and meet the income and cash asset test. Assistance includes tuition and enrolment fees (up to $200 in respect of any one course), transportation costs, and care costs (dependent children, people with disabilities, elderly). |
| **Driver licence programmes (current)** |
| Driver licence programme help people on income support gain a drivers licence. MSD contracts with driving schools to help participants obtain a private driver's licence to help them prepare to move into employment. |
| **Earthquake Support Subsidy (2010-2017)** |
| Earthquake Support Subsidy was a payment created for employers with fewer than 20 staff to assist them to continue to pay their employees during the disruption to their business because of earthquakes. The payment was a wage subsidy, paid for up to four weeks and made directly to the employer, who then paid their employees. The subsidy was paid to businesses where earthquake damage meant they could not operate and were unable to pay staff wages.Earthquake Support Subsidy involves: - $350 per week gross wage subsidy- advance lump sum paid to the employer- the employer could top-up the subsidy- firms holding insurance cover for loss of earnings were expected to use this before accessing the subsidy.The subsidy was initially available for four weeks, though businesses could reapply after four weeks if they were still unable to operate.  |
| **Employment Participation and Inclusion services (2016-)** |
| Employment Participation and Inclusion services are a range of services to support people with disabilities to participate in employment. Employment Participation and Inclusion services may provide support for people who have one or more disability to gain or retain sustainable employment. Assistance includes: Supported Employment and Employment Placement services - to provide support to place people with disabilities into open paid employment and where required the provision of on-going support to assist them to remain in employmentSupport Funds (Job Support and Training Support) provide assistance for the 'cost of disability'. These services are available where an individual has:- one or more disability that is likely to continue for more than six months- the disability presents a barrier to employment- where support is required in addition to general employment assistance programmes and services.  |
| **Employment Placement or Assistance Initiative (2005-)** |
| Employment Placement or Assistance Initiatives are contracted interventions to support, enable and place participants into employment and help them remain in work. Contracts are performance-based, usually requiring a fixed percentage of participants enrolled to exit into employment and to also sustain that for a specified period. Payments are generally paid when participants achieve a benefit exit into work or move into part-time work for people who do not have full-time work obligations. Additional incentive payments are made for sustaining employment for specified periods (usually around three to six months). An emphasis is put on targeting people disadvantaged in the labour market and supporting their future benefit independence. |
| **Employment Workshop (2009-2013)** |
| Employment Workshops were group-based activities to help participants with their job search in a supported and structured environment. The workshops ran for one hour and involved a trained facilitator talking to modular-based topics, and then helping the group with self-directed job search activities. |
| **Enterprise Allowance (1985-2012)** |
| The Enterprise Allowance programme was designed to help people on income support to start their own business. Potential participants had to develop a business plan which was assessed for viability. If the business plan was considered viable the participant received a grant to cover capital costs of establishing the business and referred to as Enterprise Capitalisation. In addition, the participants received a subsidy for living costs during the initial establishment of the business until cash flows were large enough to support the participant. Participants were not required to pay back the capital grant or the subsidy. |
| **Flexi-wage (2012-)** |
| Flexi-wage is a wage subsidy and extra assistance to support employers to take on people who do not meet the entry level requirements of the job. This helps people get the employment skills and experience they need to get into and stay in unsubsidised employment. The amount paid and the duration of the subsidy is based on a person's needs and barriers to employment and the level of support they need to reach the entry-level requirements of the job.The Flexi-wage Subsidy is split into three bands. Band 1 is $6,624 over 24 weeks, band 2 is $9,936 gross over 36 weeks, and band 3 is equivalent to the adult minimum wage for 30 hours work per week, up to $22,000 (gross) in a 52-week period.Flexi-wage can include extra assistance to cover costs associated with helping participants to meet the entry level requirements of the job. This includes up to $1,000 for short-term training and up to $5,000 of NZQF accredited training. In addition to training support, participants can also receive in-work support. The total amount of assistance for Flexi-wage within a 52-week period cannot exceed $22,000. |
| **Flexi-wage Project in the Community (2012-)** |
| Flexi-wage Project in the Community is a subsidised voluntary community-based work experience programme. The programme is designed to allow participants to experience project-based work where they can develop work habits and general on-the-job skills. The secondary goal is to assist with the completion of community or environmental projects that would not otherwise be undertaken.The subsidy is paid under Flexi-Wage Band 3 (the maximum payable is equivalent to the adult minimum wage for 30 hours work per week, up to $22,000 (gross) in any 52-week period). Sponsor must pay wages at least equal to the minimum wage, provide agreed training, and ensure appropriate supervision and materials to complete the project. |
| **Flexi-Wage Self-Employment (2012-)** |
| Flexi-wage Self-Employment is a wage subsidy to help clients overcome financial barriers associated with moving into self-employment. To be eligible, they need to be disadvantaged in the local labour market and at risk of long-term benefit receipt. To access the programme, the participants need to prepare a business plan and have it independently vetted. Flexi-Wage Self- Employment is a wage subsidy to cover the day-to-day living costs until cash flow from the business is large enough to support the participant. It is also often packaged with other assistance such as the Self-Employment Start-Up Grant (to cover capital costs of setting up a business) and the Business, Training and Advice Grant (to cover vetting and supports like mentoring and training). |
| **Foundation Focused Training (2010-2013)** |
| Foundation Focused Training Opportunities (FFTO) was a contracted training programme. FFTO was designed to enable people with low qualifications and at high risk of long-term benefit receipt to participate in further education or training. The objective of FFTO was to assisted people to acquire the foundation skills needed to enter employment or further education or training. Training courses had a strong focus on language, literacy and numeracy skills and ran for a maximum duration of 26 weeks. On completion of FFTO, the training provider was responsible for job placement and post-placement support of participants. |
| **Health Interventions (2005-)** |
| Targeted Health Interventions are programmes for people on health- or disability-related benefits who want to work. In partnership with health providers, these programmes assist people in accessing a wide range of health, employment, and community services designed to help them to return to work. |
| **In Work Support (current)** |
| In Work Support involves non-financial assistance to help people transition from benefit into employment. In Work Support providers try to help with issues such as financial difficulties, family and life demands, and labour market conditions. In Work Support can be conducted by MSD staff or external providers. |
| **Information Services Initiative** |
| Information Services Initiatives are local initiatives to provide information on labour market opportunities and assistance available from Work and Income. |
| **Job For A Local (2011)** |
| Job for a Local was a short-term wage subsidy programme designed to encourage Canterbury employers to take on staff after the September 2010 and February 2011 earthquakes. The subsidy was intended to promote permanent employment. Job for a Local provided a $3,000 wage subsidy, in two payments, to employers who took on disadvantaged job seekers before the end of June 2011. From July 2011, the subsidy was increased to $5,000 per person employed and had to include a training plan. |
| **Job Opportunities with Training (2011-2012)** |
| Job Opportunities with Training was a subsidised work experience programme combined with on-the-job training. Employers received an initial subsidy payment of $3,000 to employ a young person under the age of 25. A further $2,000 was paid after the young person spent six months with the employer and the agreed training was provided. Job Opportunities with Training was targeted at people under 25 years of age, receiving income support for at least 13 weeks or assessed as at risk of long-term benefit receipt. |
| **Job Ops (2009-2011)** |
| Job Ops was a six month subsidised job placement for people aged 16 to 24 years with limited work experience and low skill levels, to help them build confidence, and demonstrate their ability to work. The subsidy consisted of an initial payment of $3,000, weekly wage subsidies of $192.31 (including GST), and a further payment of $2,000 once the employee completed six months of work. |
| **Job Search Initiatives** |
| Job Search Initiatives are designed to improve the job search skills of participants, and to ensure that job seekers, especially short-term job seekers, were actively in looking for work. The content of these programmes is generic and can vary between service centres. |
| **Jobs With A Future (2009-2011)** |
| Jobs with a Future addressed skills shortages in industries by supporting people on income support in gaining industry-specific skills and then placing them into an established vacancy. Jobs with a Future pre-employment training lasted up to 12 weeks before participants were matched to local employers. Post-placement career support, lasting up to three months, was designed to help participants sustain employment. |
| **Jobseeker Support Health Condition or Disability 52-week reapplication (2011-)** |
| People on a Jobseeker Support-related benefit with work obligation exception due to health condition or disability are required to reapply for their benefit every 52 weeks after initial benefit grant. As part of the application, people need to complete a Comprehensive Work Assessment. If they do not reapply before their benefit grant anniversary date, their benefit is automatically cancelled. In addition, if they do not show a commitment to finding employment, their reapplication for benefit may be declined. |
| **Jobseeker Support Work Ready 52-week benefit reapplication (2010-)** |
| All people on a Jobseeker Support Work Ready benefit are required to reapply for their benefit every 52 weeks. As part of the process, participants complete a Comprehensive Work Assessment (CWA) interview that assesses their assistance needs and commitment to finding work. People who do not complete the reapplication process, without good reason, have their benefits cancelled on their anniversary. If they later want to return to benefit, they need to go through the full reapplication process. |
| **Limited Services Volunteer (1993-)** |
| Limited Services Volunteer (LSV) is an employment programme targeted at people aged 18 to 24 years who are not currently in employment, education, or training. The goal of the LSV programme is to improve young peoples' self-discipline, self-confidence, motivation and initiative to help them move into sustainable employment or other training opportunities.The main part of LSV is a six-week residential, motivational training course delivered by the New Zealand Defence Force in partnership with MSD, with support from the New Zealand Police. During the six-weeks, LSV participants stay at an army barracks and are issued with full uniform for the duration of the training. While the course takes place in a military environment and uses military facilities, only the parade ground drill and physical training activities are similar to military training; other activities include camps and three-to-four day tramps. There is a strong emphasis on obeying service discipline with customs and regulations of the Defence Force. Participants At the conclusion of the course, LSV trainees receive a certificate of service and take part in a graduation parade. After completing the course, participants are given case management and placement support to help them with gaining employment or taking up further study. |
| **Local Industry Partnerships (2005-2013)** |
| Local Industry Partnerships helped industries, employers and government to establish a co-ordinated employment training and recruitment framework. MSD Work and Income teams formed partnerships with industry sectors, and employers experiencing skill and labour shortages. Job seekers were selected and given training designed to meet the entry-level requirements for the specific industry. |
| **Mainstream Employment Programme (1975-)** |
| The Mainstream Employment Programme provides a package of wage and training subsidies, and other support, to help people that have a disability or health condition including neurodiversity to obtain work and gain work skills. Participants are placed in created jobs, for a one-year period, to assist them to gain the knowledge, skills and experience necessary to gain employment on merit in the future. The positions created are tailored to the skills and abilities of the participant and the needs of the employer. Although the expected outcome of the programme is that each participant will retain the job when the subsidy ends, no guarantee of on-going employment is required of employers. |
| **Mana in Mahi (2018-)** |
| Mana in Mahi - Strength in Work aims to support job seekers who need extra support to gain a recognised industry qualification and achieve long-term sustainable employment. The programme can provide support for up to two years and includes a wage subsidy to employers who are willing to hire a person at risk of long-term benefit receipt. It also offers a training pathway that includes an industry training qualification, including apprenticeships.In the first year, the wage subsidy is up to $16,000, while for the second year the maximum is $8,000 (excluding GST). Wage subsidy payments are conditional on the employee enrolling, commencing and then remain employed and staying in training. The employee also receives incentive payments of up to $3000 if they remain in employment and continue their training as well as up to $8,000 in industry training course fees not covered by Fees Free or the Targeted Training and Apprenticeship Fund (TTAF). Mana in Mahi also offers Additional Educational Support funding of up to $2,000 per year, as well as free coaching and mentoring services (Whitiki Taua) to both employers and employees.  |
| **Mental Health Employment Service Trial (2013-2016)** |
| Mental Health Employment Service Trial was a voluntary contracted-out job placement service. The service was targeted to people on Jobseeker Support with mild to moderate mental health issues (stress, depression or anxiety). Participants are referred to external providers for case management to help them move into employment. Provider payments are linked, in part, to participants exiting benefit and remaining in work. |
| **New Initiative**  |
| New Initiatives are newly designed and developed programmes, or services, that assist people on income support to progress into employment. New Initiatives programmes allowed MSD to trial new services for different beneficiary cohorts and for service centres to respond quickly to changing labour market needs and opportunities by trialling new programmes to move people closer towards, or to gain, employment. |
| **Oranga Mahi - REACH (2016-2021)** |
| The Realising Employment through Active Coordinated Healthcare (REACH) supports people with mental health or psycho-social issues obtain employment. REACH is a voluntary opt-in service delivers as a partnership between MSD and Waikato DHB. During the 20 week intensive service , the Waikato DHB REACH team use Cognitive Behavioural Techniques (CBT) as part of a wider rehabilitation programme to promote participant's independence and self-management as well as assisting them to establish regular routines as part of a normal working week. Participants also receive a range of supports while participating in REACH:- A Living Well Coach supports participants to establish healthy routines. - A Key Worker meets with participants weekly and uses CBT to support them to improve their wellbeing and achieve their goals. Participants have joint meetings with their case manager and Key Worker support to access any further support services.  |
| **OSCAR Provider Assistance (1999-)** |
| OSCAR Provider Assistance programme gives both annual and ongoing funding to help with the services costs for OSCAR (Out of School Care and Recreation) services delivered by community providers. OSCAR programmes provide before and after-school childcare as well as holiday programmes for children aged 5 to 13 years. Alongside the OSCAR subsidy, this assistance aims to support parents of school aged children to enter employment and engage in further training and education by offering them accessible, affordable and flexible childcare. |
| **PATHS (2004-)** |
| Providing Access to Health Solutions (PATHS) was an employment programme for people on health- and disability-related benefits who require assistance to return to employment. The PATHS service was provided through partnerships between MSD, District Health Boards (DHBs), Primary Health Organisations (PHOs) and Community Mental Health Non-Government Organisations (NGOs). These partnerships assisted participants in accessing a wide range of health, employment and community services to help them return to work. The service allowed for the funding of interventions that would not normally have been available through the publicly funded health sector within six months of an issue being identified. |
| **Recruitment Seminar (2010-2013)** |
| The Recruitment Seminar was a group-based activity designed to help job seekers with their job search in a supported and structured environment, by providing access to employers and training providers, available vacancies, and facilitator support. The seminar was compulsory for all job seekers who had been receiving unemployment related benefits for four weeks. |
| **Regional Economic Development (Unknown)** |
| Government is investing in regionally focused initiatives to enhance economic development opportunities. The Provincial Development Unit (PDU) has been established to support delivery of these commitments. We also have a suite of Regional Economic Activity Tools that present social and economic data on our regions. |
| **Skills for Growth (2011-2012)** |
| Skills for Growth provided a subsidy of up to $5,000 to employers to employ and up-skill young people, aged 16 to 24 years, in high demand industries. The subsidy contributed towards the costs of training young employees, where employers supported them to attain an industry-recognised qualification at NCEA level two or above, or offer them permanent employment. |
| **Skills for Industry (2012-)** |
| The Skills for Industry programme provides short-term job-focused training for people on income support who require up-skilling for specific requirements identified by industry. The programmes are short- to medium-term and tailored to job-specific requirements for particular vacancies (eg retail skills, hospitality skills etc). Training can be offered as pre-employment or in-work training, and programmes can be delivered by providers or employers. |
| **Skills Investment (2007-2012)** |
| Skill Investment was a temporary hiring subsidy to compensate employers for hiring disadvantaged job seekers over more suitable applicants. The level and duration of the subsidy reflected the anticipated level of assistance required for the participant to reach required levels of productivity for a position. The subsidy covered employer costs, such as the time spent training the participant, and for other associated costs. At the end of the subsidy period, the employer was expected to retain the participant. |
| **Sole Parent Employment Service Trial (2013-2016)** |
| Sole Parent Employment Service Trial was a voluntary contracted-out job placement programme targeted at sole parents with full- or part-time work obligations. Participants were referred to external providers, who supported them to move closer to full-time employment. Payments to providers were in part based on participants exiting benefit into employment. |
| **Sole Parent Support 52-week reapplication (2016-)** |
| People on Sole Parent Support benefit are required to reapply for their benefit every 52 weeks after initial benefit grant. As part of the application, people need to complete a Comprehensive Work Assessment. If they do not reapply, their benefit is automatically cancelled. |
| **Straight 2 Work (2004-2012)** |
| Straight 2 Work was a pre-employment training programme. Straight 2 Work worked with employer to identify employment opportunities and what skills and qualifications required for the job. The programme then selected participants who received relevant training for up to 12 weeks before being placed with the employer. Once placed, participants could receive an additional three months of post-placement support. |
| **Taskforce Green (1991-2012)** |
| Taskforce Green was a subsidised work experience programme placing participants on non-profit environmental projects. Placements could last up six months, with the minimum wage paid to participants split between the project organiser and MSD. The goal was for participants to build their confidence and work habits, while at the same time benefiting local communities and the environment through work that would not otherwise be undertaken. |
| **Training for Work (2011-)** |
| Training for Work (TFW) assists participants at risk of long-term benefit receipt to acquire industry-focused skills that are needed to enter employment. TFW courses run for a maximum duration of 13 weeks, and on completion include job placement and post-placement support for participants. Training is provided in a variety of learning environments including polytechnics, marae, private training establishments and workplaces. Providers of TFW courses must be registered and accredited by the New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA) to enable learners to gain recognised national qualifications. Learners generally complete unit standards towards National Certificates. |
| **Training Incentive Allowance (1983-)** |
| The Training Incentive Allowance (TIA) provides financial assistance for participating in education and training. The aim of TIA is to enable participants to undertake employment-related training to improve their employment outcomes in the future.Three groups of people receiving a main benefit are eligible for TIA:- sole parents (Sole Parent Support and Jobseeker Support)- those caring for someone with a long-term health condition or disability (Supported Living Payment Carer)- have a long-term health condition or disability themselves (Supported Living Payment only).TIA can be used for courses up to New Zealand Qualifications Framework level 7 (a Bachelor's degree or equivalent).TIA covers the necessary and reasonable costs of attending a course and includes, but is not limited to, transport, childcare, course fees, equipment and books. The allowance is paid for the actual costs incurred to the participant. In 2021, the largest amount a participant could claim was $114.19 for each course week. Participants can study up to 40 weeks over any a 52-week period, giving a total payable of $4,567.60. There is no limit on the number of years that a participant can claim TIA. |
| **Transition to Work Grant (2007-)** |
| The Transition to Work Grant is a non-taxable, non-recoverable payment that can be made to people on income support. The Transition to Work Grant provides flexible financial assistance to help meet the additional costs of entering into employment. The Transition to Work Grant can also be used to help with job interviews and related pre-employment costs. |
| **Vacancy Placement Full time** |
| A free MSD vacancy placement service where employers can lodge vacancies. Work brokers then select and profile potential candidates for the employer. Work brokers have the option of providing further assistance in the form of training or a hiring subsidy. In cases where further assistance is provided, these interventions are evaluated separately (for example hiring wage subsidy programmes). |
| **Vacancy Placement Part time**  |
| A free MSD vacancy placement service where employers can lodge vacancies. Work Brokers then select and profile potential candidates for the employer. Work Brokers have the option of providing further assistance in the form of training or a hiring subsidy. In cases where further assistance is provided, these interventions are evaluated separately (for example hiring wage subsidy programmes). |
| **Vocational Services Employment (-2016)** |
| Vocational Services were a range of services to support people with disabilities to participate in employment. Vocational Services provided support for people who had one or more disability to gain or retain sustainable employment. Assistance included:- Supported Employment and Employment Placement services - to provide support to place people with disabilities into open paid employment and where required the provision of on-going support to assist them to remain in employment- Support Funds - the collective name for Job Support, Training Support, Modification Grant and Self Start  These services were available where an individual had i) one or more disability that was likely to continue for more than six months, and ii) the disability presented a barrier to employment, and iii) where support was required in addition to general employment assistance programmes and services.  |
| **Work Ability Assessment (2014-)** |
| A Work Ability Assessment (WAA) is an independent assessment to identify the skills a person has, what type of work is suitable, and what assistance they may need. The purpose of WAA is to assist case managers when to identifying what assistance a person might need to progress towards employment. The WAA is primarily for Job Seekers with a medical deferral but is also open to people who have been out of work for a long time and are keen to work. Before the case manager refers the participant, they need to complete a self-assessment and Work Ability Assessment referral form. Once the self-assessment process is completed, the participant is assessed by a suitably qualified medical or health professional, such as a psychologist or occupational therapist, experienced in helping people into work. After the assessment, the provider give a report to the Regional Disability or Health Advisor (RHA/RDA) to work through what support the Ministry can provide. Based on this information, the case managers discuss with the participant with the assessment findings and includes agreed actions in their plan. |
| **Work and Income Seminar (Unknown)** |
| Work and Income seminars are designed to make clients aware of all available Work and Income assistance before their initial case management interview, and to encourage clients to move into work. |
| **Work Bonus (2013-)** |
| Work Bonus is paid as an incentive to, and in recognition of, an individual's efforts to gain and commence paid employment and exit the benefit system when they do not have work obligations. The payment is a non-taxable and non-recoverable, and can be made to individuals on specific benefits who do not have full-time work obligations and who cancel their benefits to move into employment. Work Bonus can only be paid once in a 52-week period and equates to the individual's full benefit rate for the first week it is paid. Subsequently, the payment rate decreases by $100 each week until it is less than $10 ($5 for partners), when it ceases. |
| **Work Confidence (Unknown)** |
| Work confidence programmes are short-term courses designed to provide the skills, motivation and confidence needed to help participants move into employment or undertake further training or education. |
| **Work Preparation Services (Unknown)** |
| Work preparation programmes are short interventions to help people to prepare for employment. The types of assistance covered includes work confidence and motivation programmes, drivers licencing and work certificates, workability assessments, careers guidance and mentoring, drug testing. |
| **Work to Wellness (2016-)** |
| Work to Wellness is a contracted case management service for people with a mental health diagnosis, to assist them to prepare for work, find a job and support them and their employer when they start work. The provider assists participants to find work by: supporting job search activities, identifying employment opportunities that are appropriate to the participant's work preference, brokering appropriate employment through their employer networks, providing post-placement support for up to 12 months for participants in full-time employment or off-benefit. |
| **WRK4U (2003-2019)** |
| WRK4U was a pre-benefit seminar for people planning to apply for work-obligated benefits. The seminar set out the eligibility criteria and mutual obligations for unemployment-related benefits as well as identifying available job opportunities. |
| **Youth Seminar (Unknown)** |
| Youth Seminars target people on income support under the age of 24 and cover what vacancies are available and keep participants focussed on getting a job. |
| **Youth Service (NEET) (2012-)** |
| Youth Service for NEET is a voluntary contracted case management service for people between 15 and 17 years of age who are at risk of being not in education, employment or training (NEET). The Youth Service NEET providers are expected to provide a wrap-around service for the young person targeted according to their needs. Examples of services include brokering education, training or employment opportunities for young people, or helping young people source affordable accommodation. Payments to providers are in part linked to the outcomes of participants: participation in education or training, NCEA level 2 or higher qualifications, not be receiving a main benefit or serving a custodial sentence three months after the end of the school year/end of training course following their 18th birthday. |
| **Youth Service (YP) (2012-)** |
| The Youth Service (YP) is a compulsory contracted case management programme for people receiving the Youth Payment (YP). Youth Service providers case manage participants, including income support, managed financial assistance and wrap around support. The overall objective of the Youth Service YP is to reduce long-term benefit receipt, assist participants to achieve NCEA level 2 or higher qualifications and improve their life skills. Payments to providers are in part based on the outcomes achieved by participants. |
| **Youth Service (YPP) (2012-)** |
| The Youth Service (YPP) is a mandatory contracted case management programme for people receiving the Young Parent Payment (YPP). Youth Service providers case manage participants, including managing income support entitlements, managed financial assistance and wrap around support. The overall objective of the Youth Service (YPP) is to reduce long-term benefit receipt, assist participants to achieve NCEA level 2 or higher qualifications and improve their life skills. |
| **Youth Transitions Services (2005-2012)** |
| Youth Transition Services (YTS) was a voluntary case management service that assisted school leavers into further education, training, work or other meaningful activities. The goal of the service was to improve participants' long-term independence and wellbeing. |

# References

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Dixon & Crichton (2016) Evaluation of the Impact of the Youth Service: NEET programme, The Treasury, Wellington (File ref:A9299141)[link](https://treasury.govt.nz/publications/wp/evaluation-impact-youth-service-neet-programme-html)

1. Expenditure is expressed in nominal dollars (ie not CPI-adjusted) and includes indirect costs. Appendix 2 summarises how we calculated the cost of EA interventions. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. In this report, we round expenditure values to the nearest million for values over 10 million and to the nearest $100,000 for values under 10 million dollars. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Public Finance Act (2013) Section 34, 2b: The chief executive of a department that administers an appropriation is responsible for advising the appropriation minister on the efficiency and effectiveness of any departmental expenses or departmental capital expenditure under that appropriation. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Currently we do not have a reliable measure of household income, so the analysis is based on individual income only and does not account for the number of dependents a person might have. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. These are substitution (a participant takes a vacancy that would have been filled by someone else) and displacement (subsidised labour can reduce employment among competing firms). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. the 52-week reapplication processes were paused between March 2020 and March 2021 in response to COVID-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. The WRK4U intervention ceased operating in October 2019, while 52-week reapplications where suspended from March 2020 onward in response to the COVID lockdown. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. No longer receiving a main benefit (e.g. Jobseeker Allowance, Sole Parent Support or Supported Living Payment) or receiving employment assistance, such as wage subsidies that mean people are off main benefit but still receiving assistance. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. includes the OSCAR (Out of School Care and Recreation) subsidy. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. WSS and WFCM services ended in July 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Impact in this report means the change in outcomes for people receiving the intervention relative to a similar group of people who do not participate. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)