

Independent review of the security environment for the Ministry of Social Development

17 December 2014

Phase 2 report

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Executive summary

The Ministry of Social Development (“Ministry”) provides services for some of the most vulnerable people in New Zealand, helping them to lead safe, strong, and independent lives. To have a real impact in people’s lives means that the Ministry often needs to have close contact with those they work with – to build rapport and assist people, not just administer entitlements.

The staff who deliver these important services need to be assured of their safety and security, and the Ministry’s broad range of clients and stakeholders also expect a safe and secure environment for their interactions with the Ministry. It is imperative that the Ministry has the right measures in place to provide this assurance.

The tragic shooting at the Ashburton Work and Income site on 1 September 2014 that resulted in the death of two staff members and serious injury to a third, has been a catalyst for the Ministry to reflect on what more it could do to ensure that staff are safe and secure.

Purpose of this report

The Chief Executive of the Ministry commissioned an independent review of the Ministry’s physical security environment following the Ashburton event. The Review has been carried out across two phases. Phase 1 of the Review was completed on 26 September 2014 and addressed the question:

Given the Ministry’s functions and activities and the risks associated with those, were all practicable steps taken to ensure the safety of Ministry employees in relation to the shooting at the Ashburton office?

The Phase 1 findings in relation to this question were:

- A) The Ashburton event was caused by a significant hazard.
- B) In relation to the Ashburton event, the Ministry took all practicable steps to seek to ensure the safety of its employees.

This report follows on from Phase 1 and completes Phase 2 of the Review. The purpose of this report is to address the question:

What changes are recommended to the physical security environment in Ministry workplaces to ensure the physical safety of staff and members of the public from threats and assaults?

Independent Reviewers

The Review was carried out by two independent Reviewers:

- Rob Robinson CNZM, former NZ Police Commissioner
- Murray Jack FCA, Chairman, Deloitte NZ.

The independent Reviewers have been supported by an Advisory Group, and the members are set out in “Introduction and background” below. The Terms of Reference for this Review has been attached in Appendix A. A small project team and Ministry secretariat for the Review has supported the independent Reviewers.

Constraints

We have taken care not to disclose any information in the body of this report that, due to its security-sensitive nature, could potentially compromise the safety of staff. Appendix E includes more detailed considerations and a high-level roadmap for the Ministry to implement our recommendations, but is withheld from public release because it is security-sensitive.

Observations regarding the Ministry’s approach to safety and security

The Ministry’s safety and security operating model has evolved over time, rather than being deliberately defined as a consequence of strategic planning.

This is reflected in the extent to which capability is in place and requirements have been defined. While there is some Ministry-wide guidance and policies, major service lines have evolved their own culture and practical approaches for managing risks, based on their service, client and stakeholder characteristics. With such a devolved approach, there is heavy reliance on local site manager’s capabilities and their understanding of risk management practices.

Many of the observations – e.g. around inconsistent practices and culture – are likely to have similar causes rooted in a historic lack of systems-based thinking and explicit design of a safety and security approach. We support the work the Ministry has commenced on risk appetite and the needs it is identifying for Ministry-wide baselines / bottom-lines, strong training and support for staff to equip and empower them to more effectively manage and mitigate safety and security risks.

The observations outlined in this report indicate that the Ministry’s approach to safety and security is not yet mature and needs to be more cohesively planned and formalised.

Recommendations

Our twelve recommendations are listed below. Each recommendation has a specific objective the Ministry needs to achieve.

1. The Ministry should formalise and develop its explicit safety and security operating model, based on the Risk Appetite work that has already progressed. This is an overarching recommendation to create a greater level of formal purpose and control over safety and security. It will involve strategic planning, documentation and agreement to the overall principles and design of safety and security at the Ministry.

Objective: The Ministry has a clear strategy and definition for its approach to safety and security. This means it is readily able to communicate to staff and other stakeholders what the strategy and approach are, and ultimately how detailed design decisions support the strategy and approach.

2. The Ministry needs to review its organisational structures and roles for coherent and cohesive management of safety and security. This should include specific governance arrangements focussed on safety and security, across all of the Ministry's business streams. Senior Leadership involvement and support is critical.

Objective: There is consistent and clear accountability and management of safety and security, with timely information flows and decisions, and the ability to continually improve mitigations.

3. The Ministry should complete the assessment of the potential and likely impacts of the Health and Safety Reform Bill on its operations including relationships with third party providers and NGOs. This is important not only for proactive planning of the Ministry's response (e.g. amending current contracting arrangements) but also to promote engagement with other agencies and, if appropriate, provide input into finalisation of the legislation.

Objective: The Ministry is able to plan its responses to our Review and any other intervening events based on a clear understanding of the implications of new legislation.

4. The Ministry should review key change initiatives currently underway to determine which initiatives require explicit safety and security threads or expertise to ensure solutions that are approved and implemented provide appropriate risk mitigations.

Objective: The Ministry builds safety and security into "the way we do business" as service design changes are considered and implemented.

5. The Ministry should review whether some of its services (at a detailed level) that tend to create tension or volatile situations could be effectively provided in non face-to-face ways.

Objective: The Ministry is able to reduce its risk exposure, without compromising the effectiveness of services, in specific instances.

6. The Ministry should review its policies and procedures relating to safety and security to ensure they are comprehensive. These need to be wider-scope and more detailed than what is in place at the moment and supplement broader general health & safety policies and procedures.

Development and implementation should be iterative and ensure that Ministry staff are engaged in the process, aware of changes, and involved in evaluating effectiveness.

Objective: The Ministry has more detailed and useful policies and guidance available to its staff, also providing clearer standards to test and monitor compliance.

7. The Ministry should enhance training design, delivery, monitoring and evaluation in relation to the response and mitigation of aggressive client behaviours. This should provide staff with awareness, skills and tools to manage situations and provide a proportionate and effective response to such behaviours. The training should also be integrated with customer service and service delivery training, rather than being an “add on”.

Objective: Ensure that staff have the skills to deal with clients in a way that reduces the frequency of incidents, and are able to act appropriately when an incident does occur.

8. The Ministry should clearly specify and implement standards for its sites and those it shares with other agencies. Individual service areas may have their own specifications based on their risks, but where sites are shared the higher-risk specification should determine the appropriate standards.

This will need to cover multi-agency co-location as well as temporary or satellite sites.

All sites should be subject to review to identify the enhancements that may be required for them to meet the Ministry’s standards.

Objective: Ensure that that all service-delivery sites have a standard of safety and security features that is in line with their risk.

9. The Ministry should improve reporting and analysis of incidents and risk information, including:

- Structured and common information standards and definitions to enable analysis and sharing of information
- Enhanced systems and tools to enable safety and security analytics, and information sharing
- Assess and address any usability issues with SOSHI as appropriate

Objective: Provide visibility of identified risks across the Ministry, and insights to decision-makers.

10. The Ministry should review deployment of security guards across sites in terms of numbers and their role. It should consider a site, demographic, hazard/risk specific approach to determining how security guards are deployed for the various types of sites, clarify the skills and competencies required for the role, and specific activities that

security guards should carry out. Deployment of security guards should be seen as a component of the Site Security Plan and be subject to periodic review.

It is important to note that deployment of security guards of itself cannot be expected to eliminate the potential for extreme events to occur.

Objective: Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of security guard deployment.

11. The Ministry should review adequacy of specific equipment that is already used in some areas / instances, but not available or used consistently.

Objective: Ensure that staff consistently have the right tools available and use these to mitigate risks while carrying out their work.

12. The Ministry should promote a more risk-aware culture within the Ministry so that staff attitudes and behaviours reflect and support the desired operating model. We do not believe that this can be effective as a stand-alone "culture initiative" but instead needs to be integrated across each of the other work-streams.

Objective: Ensure that all Ministry staff treat safety and security seriously, and have the knowledge and understanding needed to be effective in their roles.

Having now worked through the review of the wider security environment of the Ministry, and reflecting on our findings from Phase 1, specifically in relation to the extreme event at Ashburton, we are able to affirm our finding from Phase 1 that the event in Ashburton was not preventable. That event was extreme at every level, and even if the Ministry fully adopts and implements all of our recommendations, while in our view this would improve the overall security environment of the Ministry's workplaces, extreme events could still occur.

Wider government implications

In conducting this review we have identified a number of implications for the public sector more broadly. As these need to be raised and discussed at appropriate cross-government forums, we have raised these issues with the State Services Commission, as system leader, to consider and lead the development of suitable solutions. The Ministry will be an important participant and stakeholder in these forums.

These implications relate to:

- Information sharing
- Co-location
- Protective security and guards
- Multi-agency change programmes
- Mental health

Acknowledgments

We have had the full cooperation and assistance of the Ministry's staff and management team throughout this review. We appreciate that this cooperation and assistance has come during an extremely difficult time for all Ministry staff.

Introduction and background

Following the tragic shooting at the Ashburton Work and Income site on 1 September 2014, which resulted in the death of two staff members and serious injury to a third, the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development (“Ministry”) commissioned an independent review of the Ministry’s physical security environment.

Purpose

The Review has been carried out across two phases. Phase 1 of the Review was completed on 26 September 2014 and addressed the question:

Given the Ministry’s functions and activities and the risks associated with those, were all practicable steps taken to ensure the safety of Ministry employees in relation to the shooting at the Ashburton office?

The Phase 1 findings in relation to this question were:

- A) The Ashburton event was caused by a significant hazard.
- B) In relation to the Ashburton event, the Ministry took all practicable steps to seek to ensure the safety of its employees.

This report follows on from Phase 1 and completes Phase 2 of the Review. The purpose of this report is to address the question:

What changes are recommended to the physical security environment in Ministry workplaces to ensure the physical safety of staff and members of the public from threats and assaults?

The Terms of Reference for the Review are included in Appendix A.

Approach

The Terms of Reference sets out the various aspects of security in scope for consideration, as well as the reviewers.

The independent Reviewers have been supported by the following Advisory Group for Phase 2:

- Sir Maarten Wevers (Chair), former Chief Executive, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
- Bridget White (State Services Commission)
- Craig Sims (ANZ)
- Graham Maloney (Department of Human Services – Australia)

- Jo Field (Department of Corrections)
- Glenn Barclay (Public Service Association)

Legislative and policy context

Health and Safety

The principal legislation relevant to security in the context of this Review is the [Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992](#) (“the Act”).

We note that the [Health and Safety Reform Bill](#) currently before Parliament, if passed, will make explicit and clarify obligations, and we have also considered its implications.

Appendix B includes information about the relevant legislative and policy framework for health and safety. This is important to understand the specific terms used and obligations of the Ministry in relation to health and safety.

Service Requirements

We have also considered the legislation that sets out the Ministry’s service obligations. This is essential to understand the priorities, pressures and operational factors that drive the Ministry’s operating model and delivery.

These key pieces of legislation are set out in the “Key legislation and implications” section and illuminate the implications and context for this Review.

Focus areas

A number of points were raised during Phase 1 of our review to be specifically addressed during Phase 2:

- Any recommendations relating to an all-of-government approach (e.g. client risk profiling and information sharing) to reducing safety risks
- Any recommendations relating to the environmental design of the current workplace environment
- Recommendations for additional physical security features

While our work has been to look at safety and security broadly and holistically, these have been specific areas of focus during this phase of the Review.

In Phase 1, we also identified two areas for improvement in the Ministry’s approach to safety and security, and have further elaborated on these in this report:

- Improved training (which had commenced rollout in November 2013) should be expedited and followed up.
- The need for clear risk appetite and expectations to be established, which will enable the Ministry to set out clear benchmarks and tolerance levels for staff in relation to behaviour by clients.

Safety and security operating model

To help with structuring our questions and findings, we have used the concept of a “safety and security operating model”, which has 5 elements that define the overall approach to safety and security.

The elements we have considered as part of this framework are described briefly in the table below.

Table 1: Elements of the safety and security operating model

Element	Description
Risk Appetite	This is the strategic element of the operating model, defining organisational risk characteristics to determine the appropriate level of tolerance and mitigations.
Governance and management structure	This element deals with how safety and security is led, managed and monitored, including the organisational structure and roles. It sets the overall tone and controls decisions for proactive and reactive interventions.
Capability	This element covers the organisational capabilities required to ensure effective safety and security practices. This includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Policies and procedures• Systems and information• Training and awareness• Infrastructure, including physical environments
Practice	This element covers how well aspects described in Capability are implemented and working in practice – e.g. adherence to policies and procedures or delivery of training.
Culture	This element covers the attitudes and behaviours that are required or desired of the Ministry’s people.

While there are clear inter-relationships between these elements (e.g. Governance and management structure can have a significant influence on Culture, and Culture will impact Practice) the elements provide a useful framework for defining and describing the overall approach to managing safety and security.

Work undertaken

The following table sets out the work we have performed to help us reach our conclusions:

Table 2: Work undertaken

Work	Summary
Document reviews	<p>The focus has been to understand the safety and security environment within the Ministry (across all its service lines). This has included review of governance arrangements and documentation, as well as major projects relating to staff safety and security.</p>
Interviews with Ministry staff	<p>We have conducted interviews and focus groups with Ministry staff to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Validate our understanding of the Ministry’s safety and security controls • Understand the Ministry’s operational and management context • Understand the extent of information sharing that occurs within the Ministry (across service lines) • Understand the Ministry’s governance arrangements, including roles and responsibilities, oversight and relevant change programmes. • Understand elements of culture, training and awareness related to health, safety and security across the Ministry’s service lines • Understand the knowledge and commitment of staff in relation to safety and security • Identify and understand some of the wider challenges faced by each of the Ministry’s service lines.
Site visits	<p>We conducted a total of 23 site visits which covered a sample of all Ministry service lines (including secure residences, family homes and supervised group homes, as well as considering mobile service delivery where the Ministry staff visit public or private places as part of their job) to observe general safety and security arrangements and key staff practices.</p> <p>We also conducted three site visits of other agencies to understand their:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • approach to safety and security • physical security characteristics

Work	Summary
Legal advice	We have taken advice from the Crown Law Office on several aspects of the review.
Analysed incident data	We have reviewed and analysed data from the Ministry's incident reporting and complaints system to identify volumes and trends of various types of incidents or injuries.
Researched relevant practice in other organisations	<p>We have sought to understand mitigations and management approaches in place at several other organisations, including other New Zealand public sector social service providers, other Australian public sector organisations, non-governmental organisations and a private sector organisation.</p> <p>This has included site visits, interviews with people from these agencies, input from the Advisory Group, and reviews of documentation.</p>
Reviewed staff feedback	The Ministry set up an email inbox for staff to provide feedback to the Review on suggested improvements, key concerns, their experiences and observations. We have reviewed the themes from this feedback. We also received and considered input from a beneficiary advocate and union groups.

Structure of this document

The following provides a brief description of the main sections of this report.

Operating context and service requirements

This section provides context about the Ministry, including legislation and strategic priorities.

More detail is included in Appendix C.

Service delivery

This section provides a brief overview of the nature of the Ministry's sites and service delivery. We have distinguished between interactions that have inherently different risk profiles:

- Non face-to-face interactions
- Face-to-face interactions at Ministry sites
- Face-to-face interactions offsite

More detail is included in Appendix D.

Observations on the current state

This section summarises the observations we have made through our work that provide important context for our recommendations. We have not sought to comprehensively detail current arrangements in this report.

What should the Ministry do?

This section provides our recommendations. Each recommendation has an associated objective, which is what the Ministry should seek to achieve.

More detailed considerations and a potential high-level roadmap of activities to implement the recommendations have been provided to the Ministry in Appendix E. Appendix E is withheld from public release because it is security-sensitive.

Wider government implications

Through the course of our review we have identified a number of implications for the public sector more broadly. These are raised in this section so that they can stimulate appropriate discussion and action.

Acknowledgements

We have had the full cooperation and assistance of the Ministry's staff and management team throughout this review. We appreciate that this cooperation and assistance has come during an extremely difficult time for all Ministry staff.

Limitations and disclaimer

This report was prepared solely in accordance with the specific terms of reference between independent Reviewers and the Ministry of Social Development ("Ministry"), and for no other purpose. Other than our responsibilities to the Ministry for this review, no member of the Review Team or their organisations undertakes responsibility arising in any way from reliance placed by a third party on this report. Any reliance placed is that party's sole responsibility. We accept or assume no duty, responsibility or liability to any other party in connection with the report or this engagement, including without limitation, liability for negligence in relation to the factual findings expressed or implied in this report.

The report is based upon information provided by the Ministry and interviewees. We have considered and relied upon this information. We have assumed that the information provided was reliable, complete and not misleading, and we have no reason to believe that any material facts have been withheld. The information provided has been considered through analysis, enquiry and review for the

purposes of this report. However, we do not warrant in any way that these enquiries have identified or verified all of the matters which an audit, extensive examination or due diligence investigation might disclose. The procedures we have performed do not constitute an assurance engagement in accordance with New Zealand Standards for Assurance Engagements, nor do they represent any form of audit under New Zealand Standards on Auditing, and consequently, no assurance or audit opinion is provided.

The statements and opinions expressed in this report have been made in good faith and on the basis that all relevant information for the purposes of preparing this report has been provided by the Ministry and interviewees and that all such information is true and accurate in all material aspects and not misleading by reason of omission or otherwise. Accordingly, we do not accept any responsibility or liability for any such information being inaccurate, incomplete, unreliable or not soundly based, or for any errors in the analysis, statements or opinions provided in this report resulting directly or indirectly from any such circumstances or from any assumptions upon which this report is based proving unjustified.

As there are or will be other formal investigations in relation to the event by other agencies (for example the current Police investigation), care has been taken not to compromise these. Furthermore, care has been taken not to disclose any information in this report that, due to its security-sensitive nature, could potentially compromise the safety of staff.

This report dated 17 December 2014 was prepared based on the information available at the time. We have no obligation to update the report or revise the information contained therein due to events and information subsequent to the date of the report.

Operating context and service requirements

Overview of the Ministry

The Ministry delivers, or purchases from other providers, a significant part of New Zealand's social services, including a range of benefits, entitlements, and services to young people and communities.

Services and assistance are provided to more than 1 million New Zealanders and 110,000 families every year.

Over recent years, the Ministry's role and functions have expanded. The Ministry is responsible for:

- Managing the statutory care and protection of vulnerable children and young people, youth justice, and adoption services
- Providing financial assistance and support to working-age New Zealanders and helping people get into sustainable work
- Assessing eligibility for social housing
- Providing entitlements to seniors, and assisting students to overcome financial barriers to higher education
- Contracting and funding a mix of services, programme delivery, and community development initiatives designed to strengthen local communities and families, such as parenting programmes
- Upholding the integrity of the benefit system and minimising debt levels of people the Ministry works with
- Focusing on specific groups through the Office for Disability Issues, Ministry of Youth Development and Office for Senior Citizens

The Ministry has a significant number of client interactions and almost 10,000 staff. In the last year, the Ministry:

- Administered on behalf of government the total spend of \$23.2 billion in social services outcomes
- Received 2 million visits to its frontline offices
- Administered 295,000 working-age benefits
- Paid New Zealand Superannuation to over 650,000 older New Zealanders
- Received 148,000 notifications of child abuse and neglect
- Took over 12 million phone calls
- Processed 3.5 million transactions for financial assistance and 6.5 million transactions relating to updates of information held
- Processed over 400,000 applications for student loans and student allowances
- Completed 4,614 fraud investigations and prosecuted 839 people for welfare fraud

The Ministry is the lead government agency for the social sector. There is an increasing emphasis on working closely with other government agencies, non-government organisations (NGOs), advisory and industry groups, and communities and iwi to improve the wellbeing of individuals, families and communities.

Single operating model

The Ministry has previously identified that its traditional approach of self-contained service lines is inefficient and unsustainable, making it difficult to work cohesively internally or across the sector. The Ministry is progressively moving towards a single integrated operating model providing a whole of Ministry view across functions and services. The Ministry is investing in governance capability and corporate systems to guide decision-making.

The new model is expected to support development of better integrated service delivery, including how to achieve the best outcomes for people with complex needs, and ensure the needs of the people the Ministry works with are at the centre of its services.

Key legislation and implications

Service requirements

The Ministry administers a range of legislation, which broadly cover its activities and service obligations. In many cases, the discretionary nature of the provisions and the ability to satisfy the provisions in a multitude of ways provides the Ministry with flexibility in how services are delivered. There are a number of implications to note:

- Face-to-face interaction with clients and the public (which can have a safety and security implication) cannot be avoided by the Ministry, if it is to meet its service responsibilities in a practical way.
- The Ministry cannot withdraw services if a client is abusive, aggressive or threatens staff.

Legal obligations relating to staff safety and security

The principal legislation relevant to security in the context of this Review is the [Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992](#) ("the Act"). Appendix B includes information about the Act and the relevant policy framework.

The key obligation relates to taking "all practicable steps" to ensure staff safety. This is generally interpreted as what a "reasonable person" would do. With greater public focus on health and safety and other organisations strengthening their operating models, we believe it is likely that the bar for what is considered "reasonable" will keep rising.

The [Health and Safety Reform Bill](#) currently before Parliament, if passed, will make explicit and clarify obligations, in particular relating to:

- The concept of “person conducting a business or undertaking” (PCBU). PCBUs must ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, the health and safety of workers engaged (whether by the PCBU or others) in the business or undertaking. This duty also applies to workers whose activities are influenced or directed by the PCBU. The worker does not need to be an employee or contractor of the PCBU.
- Strengthening accountability of officers of organisations and their leadership.
- Introducing a due diligence duty for officers (senior management and directors).

This will have significant implications for the Ministry, including the obligations that will arise from the involvement of third parties in service delivery arrangements with and for the Ministry.

Government expectations

Better public services

In 2012, the Government set 10 challenging results for the public sector to achieve over the next five years. The Ministry and its Chief Executive (CE) have direct responsibility for a number of these results.

Table 3: Responsibility for better public services results

Result	Responsibility
Reducing long term welfare dependence	The Ministry's CE is the lead for this result, supported by the Secretary of Education and the Director-General of Health. The agencies of the Social Sector Forum have agreed to share responsibility for delivering the results.
Supporting vulnerable children <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase participation in early childhood education • Increase infant immunisation rates and reduce the incidence of rheumatic fever • Reduce the number of assaults on children 	<p>The Ministries of Social Development, Education, and Health are working together, alongside the Police and the Social Sector Forum, on these three results that will support vulnerable children.</p> <p>The Ministry's CE is the lead for these results, supported by the Secretary of Education and the Director-General of Health. The agencies of the Social Sector Forum have agreed to share responsibility for delivering the results.</p>

Functional Lead across government for property

The State Services Commission has established Functional Lead roles to drive performance and efficiency across the whole public service in the areas of IT, procurement and property.

As the property lead, the Ministry is responsible for using the collective purchasing power of the public service to drive cost reductions and actively exploring co-location opportunities to make the most efficient use of space and resources. Property savings across the public sector are expected to produce approximately \$109 million per year by 2023. With that role, the Ministry has the ability to define and influence safety and security requirements into purchasing requirements.

Service delivery


The Ministry provides a diverse set of services, with both common and different stakeholders and client groups. We have summarised the nature of service delivery and interactions in this section to highlight the complex environment in which the Ministry operates.

Various modes, channels and locations for service delivery

The diagram over the page illustrates the various types of facilities and sites used by the Ministry to provide services. We have broken this down into three broad categories, being:

- **Non face-to-face interactions:** examples of which may be services provided over the phone or through digital media
- **Face-to-face interactions at Ministry sites:** where clients and other stakeholders interact directly with Ministry staff at various Ministry sites
- **Face-to-face interactions offsite:** where clients and other stakeholders interact directly with Ministry staff at various locations that are not Ministry sites

Figure 1: Types of locations for service delivery



The following provides a brief description of the various types of service locations presented at a high-level above:

- Eight Contact Centres are used for dealing with general enquiries over the phone or by email, including setting up appointments for visits to service centres / sites. This also includes significant volumes of digital information processing such as Family Violence Referrals to CYF from the Police.

The Remote Client Unit (RCU) is used by Work and Income to provide case management via phone, email, fax and mail to clients who have been trespassed from sites and / or pose a high risk to the safety of frontline staff. If a client has been trespassed they have the opportunity to appoint an agent to deal with Work and Income on their behalf. If they are unable or unwilling to appoint an agent, a client is passed over to the RCU. One of the aims of the RCU is to return clients to “normal service” at an appropriate time, and client risk assessments are done prior to expiry of trespass notices.

- There are 33 locations used for a range of specific processing activities or as support centres for the regional network of service sites. Occasionally, clients, their agents or other stakeholders will have face-to-face interactions with Ministry staff. For example, this includes walk-ins at a Seniors Support Centre or client agents meeting with an investigator in a Fraud Investigation Unit. CYF client contact at regional level is confined to management of complaints and management of escalated issues. Members of the public attend CYF Specialist Services Units for matters such as evidential interviewing and specialist assessment and counselling.

- These are what would commonly be considered “branches” – i.e. primary customer-facing services sites. There are over 170 sites across the country, including 140 Service Delivery Service Centres, and 64 CYF Service Sites. In around 35 instances, CYF and Work and Income sites are co-located in the same building (usually on separate floors).

There are also sites co-located with a range of other agencies, including the new Durham Street site in Christchurch where Inland Revenue is a co-tenant, and Community Link sites that typically have a number of NGOs and / or other government agencies sharing space with the Ministry.

- There are eight Residences operated by CYF and a ninth which is operated by a third party NGO. These are specialist facilities with secure and restricted access.

Around 80 CYF Family Homes and Family Group Homes are used to care for children and young persons where this type of placement is appropriate. In many cases, care is provided by people who are not Ministry staff.

- Service at 29 Satellite Sites was suspended after the Ashburton event. These are typically general office spaces shared part-time by the Ministry

with other businesses or local agencies.

The Ministry manages a network of 34 Heartland Sites that provide access to broad government and NGO services in rural areas. 12 of these are co-located with Service Delivery Service Centres, and 22 are coordinated through contracts held with NGOs that include one territorial authority in the Chatham Islands and one District Court in Westport.

Outreach services are often provided at other agencies' locations – for example, setting up service areas for students at Universities.

CYF staff attend Court proceedings, e.g. in a youth justice context or where Court is determining custody arrangements for a child or young person (CYP).

MSD Legal Staff also appear in both the Family and District Courts and before the Social Security Appeal Authority.

Ministry staff also organise meetings in schools and in public facilities such as libraries or municipal buildings and on marae grounds. CYF Social Workers will also meet with children, young people and their families in public areas such as parks and cafes for supervised contact, informal meetings and discussions. CYF staff are also involved in meetings at the offices of NGO partners or government agencies.

Ministry staff visit Private Workplaces as part of seeking employment opportunities for its clients. Visits to Private Homes are required, particularly by CYF Social Workers, e.g. to conduct safety assessments, uplift children into CYF care, or interact with clients and caregivers as part of ongoing case management.

Observations on the current state

This section summarises our observations of the current state of the Ministry's safety and security operating model, based on the "safety and security operating model" framework elements outlined above.

Risk Appetite

In the Phase 1 report, we identified the need for the Ministry to clearly set out its risk appetite and expectations relating to health, safety and security risk management.

The Ministry already has a risk management framework in place that sets out the Ministry's overall appetite for the security of its people. The framework states "Our [the Ministry's] expectations - for the security of our people, premises and information... and our legal and regulatory obligations" is risk averse.

- "We take the security of our people, premises or information extremely seriously and escalate concerns when these are at risk."
- "We operate professionally and comply with our legal or regulatory obligations."

Observation 1

The Ministry has recently progressed further work on defining its risk appetite. This has involved facilitated workshops with the Ministry's leadership team and subject matter experts to consider appropriate points on the continuum from "low" to "high" across six dimensions:

- Flexibility
- Tolerance
- Physical design
- Discretion
- Risk profiling
- Information sharing

The results of this process have been tested in two focus groups with operational staff drawn from all business areas of the Ministry. The Ministry is planning an engagement process with all staff.

The risk appetite work is a key platform for effective future leadership of safety and security across the Ministry. It will inform the strategic development of the future-state operating model, service delivery criteria and critically the Ministry's security environment and culture.

Governance and management structure

Overall governance is exercised by the Ministry's leadership team. Safety and security risks and issues are discussed as part of broader health & safety requirements and obligations.

At a site level, the respective Health and Safety Committees provide a focal point for discussion of safety and security hazards, issues and potential risk mitigations. These report up through their respective service line leadership.

Observation 2

There is a need for greater pan-organisational leadership of safety and security.

While the Ministry is starting to move towards a single organisational approach in general, including for governance arrangements (refer "Single operating model" above), many aspects of safety and security governance and management are currently devolved to major service lines.

There are teams and committees at National Office level, but our enquiries suggest their organisation-wide mandate is unclear or limited, and work has historically been compliance focused.

Observation 3

Safety and security are not yet fully embedded as core aspects of service design.

As far as we have been able to determine, none of the key Ministry or Ministry-led joint government change programmes have an explicit safety and security thread to ensure that options and solution designs appropriately identify and seek to facilitate risk information. Examples include:

- Modernisation programme for CYF
- Simplification programme for the Ministry overall
- Investing in Services for Outcomes programme
- Co-location of multiple agencies through the Property Management Centre of Expertise

Observation 4

Safety and security features as a priority on the Ministry's Risk & Assurance work programme.

Some work has been completed, including a review of the Safe Workplace programme and ACC compliance. More comprehensive testing of safety and security measures, their effectiveness in mitigating risks, and the Ministry's overall compliance with its obligations has not been carried out to date.

Observation 5

Although some work has commenced, the Ministry has not yet completed a detailed assessment of the impacts of the proposed [Health and Safety Reform Bill](#) currently before Parliament – for example, to identify implications for its various contractual arrangements with third parties.

Capability

Overall comments

The various sites and service lines naturally have different risk characteristics. The approach to date of devolving much of the responsibility for detailed policies and management has meant that capabilities in place reflect the judgments made by managers in operational business areas about the risks they perceive.

Observation 6

The role of Site Manager is critical in ensuring each site has appropriate capability in place.

However, with the devolved approach we have found both areas of very good practice and areas where capability is weaker. The variation reflects the range of skills, experience and domain knowledge across management, and the lack of strong central systems and planning to drive consistency at a Ministry-wide level.

Policies & Procedures

Health & safety guidance and information is available on the Ministry's intranet site for staff to access. For example, this includes information on staff safety and awareness, and the criteria and process to issue trespass notices.

Standard policies and procedures require "site safety plans" for business teams at each site. Responsibility for specific, detailed safety and security management requirements and practices is devolved, i.e. determined at a site level, rather than driven by central policies.

Observation 7

The Ministry's approach to developing safety and security policies and procedures is not yet mature or comprehensive.

Some Ministry-wide policies and procedures are in place, but these are relatively limited in scope. We found from our discussions with other organisations that many of these have a systematic approach to establishing policies and procedures. Examples include:

- Client behavioural risk and threat assessments of hazards or sites to inform tailored approaches to clients and situations, e.g. with team leaders / managers involved to approve the profile and course of action
- Explicit review of incidents and near misses to identify learnings and update policies and practices as appropriate
- Ensuring Executive- and Board-level discussion of safety and security risks and incidents occurs through making it the “first line item on any and every meeting agenda that is never skipped”
- Strict processes for logging and tracking staff who are going offsite for client interactions

Observation 8

The Ministry has developed several new policies and procedures in response to the Ashburton event. This has been a positive step to begin the process of greater centrally-planned approaches to risk mitigation. Examples include:

- Screening access at frontline sites: Visitors to these sites may be asked for formal Identification such as a drivers licence or passport before they are allowed entry to the site. Any visitor whose behaviour is a concern is declined access.
- Introducing a zero tolerance of aggressive and abusive behaviour policy at sites: If visitors threaten or assault staff, they are asked to leave, and the New Zealand Police are notified immediately.

Systems and information

The Ministry has a system (“SOSHI”) in place to record all health & safety and security incidents, with information aggregated nationally. The SOSHI information is analysed and reported on a monthly basis to operational managers. Serious incidents are reported up to service delivery Leadership Team members.

Each major service line is able to identify clients that pose a high risk through its operational system – e.g. flagging that a client has been issued a trespass notice.

Observation 9

While a Ministry-wide system (SOSHI) is in place for incident reporting, different business areas also use their own tools to collect, collate and report safety and security data.

The system does not enable significant analytics, and reports provided to governance layers do not provide granularity to help understand the nature of business hazards and risks (e.g. at a regional, site or person-specific level). This

will be a due diligence obligation of Officers arising from the Health & Safety Reform Bill proposal (Clause 39).

We also heard from discussions with staff that there are usability issues with SOSHI that make its use more time-consuming than staff would prefer, and this can act as a disincentive to accurate and complete reporting.

Observation 10

In response to the Ashburton event the Ministry is conducting an assessment across all clients to identify potential high-risk clients who could pose a threat to staff. This is a positive step that starts to address the Ministry's historic lack of risk information sharing (e.g. relating to specific locations or individuals) across service lines.

Developing a Ministry-wide view is difficult with disparate and multiple systems, but it will be important to operationalise how high-risk clients are identified and how that information is provided across all of the Ministry's operations.

Training and awareness

Frontline staff receive various health, safety and security training. This can include practical advice on how to de-escalate potentially violent situations, dealing with clients with mental health issues, and site safety plans. Training is provided as part of initial induction with subsequent refresher courses and updates.

Different service areas of the Ministry have different practices in terms of identifying training needs, training delivery and follow up.

In response to the Ashburton event, the Ministry has conducted extensive communication and engagement with staff to raise awareness and understand perspectives from the frontline. This includes implementing a 'zero-tolerance' approach for abusive/threatening/violent behaviour by clients.

Safety and security training that had been postponed immediately after the Ashburton event has now been rolled out.

Observation 11

Feedback from staff we talked to indicates there is a desire for more training. While training at induction appears relatively consistent, follow up and refresher training has been more variable.

We found from our discussions with other organisations that many of these have a strong emphasis on training and development, often using approaches where safety and security are integrated into their “service delivery” training. Typical features for these other organisations include:

- Training is a planned and well-defined organisation-wide approach, with intentional differentiation for specific roles and service areas depending on needs. Service areas have little discretion to decide what they will or will not do.
- Training encompasses situational awareness, customer aggression, de-escalation and conflict management. It also focuses on identifying and dealing effectively (in a calm and safe manner) with suspected drug or alcohol abuse and domestic violence issues.
- Training includes scenario-based learning, including practice, exercises and simulations.
- Training is ongoing (rather than one-off) and some aspects are repeated frequently to maintain currency and awareness.
- Some organisations have specialised training for team leaders and managers so that they are well-equipped not only to deal with situations but to motivate and supervise safe practices by their staff.

Observation 12

There is no structured Ministry-wide approach to recording training attendance and completion, and evaluating effectiveness of training.

Different service areas have different practices and there is no systematic ability to identify who has had what kinds of training. This makes it difficult to plan delivery and ensure all staff have had the right mix and level of training.

Infrastructure

Sites open to the general public

The Ministry operates customer-facing sites providing access for communities across New Zealand.

This includes over 200 sites that are generally “open to the public” – akin to branch networks for other organisations. The design of these customer-facing sites varies significantly. In general, Work and Income has open-plan sites while CYF sites have greater access control and separation of front and back office.

Specialised sites

The Ministry also operates a number of specialist facilities, including:

- Residences (for care & protection and youth justice), which are secure facilities with controlled access
- Family homes and group homes where multiple CYP are cared for, usually by caregivers who are not Ministry staff

Infrastructure for offsite work

The Ministry operates a fleet of around 1,200 motor vehicles. Most of these are ordinary passenger vehicles used by staff for working offsite, and some have special features (e.g. GPS tracking) and are used for transporting youth justice clients (e.g. between a residence and court).

Frontline staff who need to work offsite occasionally, have smartphones. Twenty-two satellite phones are available, to provide coverage in remote areas, as are mobile duress alarms. The availability and usage of these devices vary across sites.

Observation 13

Different physical security features and office layouts for different service lines are appropriate, given the nature of those services. We note that organisations similar to Work and Income also have open-plan sites.

There is variation within service line sites in terms of layouts, configurations, and some physical security measures. For open-plan sites this means that ease of access from the entrance and reception area to service and staff areas varies.

Observation 14

Where sites are co-located (e.g. both CYF and Work and Income), there is no single "site manager" responsible for safety and security across the whole site. The individual service lines have their own team and site management responsibilities.

We note that the Durham Street site in Christchurch is an exception. This is a recent site initiative, to explore the Ministry's gradual move to a "single operating model" and has a single site manager.

Observation 15

Security guards are in place at all Work and Income sites. Over 200 additional guards have been posted in response to the Ashburton event. The sites we have visited have provided mixed comments about the quality of their security guards.

Observation 16

Generally, public-facing Ministry sites have the security hardware we would expect to see, including CCTV, duress alarms, second exit / egress, and monitoring. However, our site visits indicated that usage and staff familiarity with these varied. Note that this also relates to our Observation 6 above, highlighting the criticality of site managers.

Practice

As described in “Policies and Procedures” above, decisions on standards and practices are largely devolved to site management. Little is prescribed centrally across the Ministry, and it is therefore not surprising that practice varies between service lines and between sites.

Observation 17

Pockets of good practice have evolved through service line specific approaches and strong site management (refer also Observation 6 above). For example, CYF sites generally have a consistent approach to planning for client / stakeholder meetings and offsite work.

However, due to little central guidance and standards some of these practices are difficult to replicate consistently. For example, effective engagement with other agencies (e.g. Mental Health services) as part of client risk assessment sometimes depends on the quality of relationships the site manager has established with specific individuals in other agencies.

Observation 18

Through our interviews, we have identified that safety and security incident reporting practice varies for incidents. We understand from staff that there has historically been relatively high tolerance of poor client behaviour in some teams, that SOSHI is time-consuming to use and that therefore not all incidents may be recorded and reported.

Anecdotally, serious incidents have occasionally been down-played and recorded as “medium” in SOSHI to avoid calls and investigation from Regional and National Office.

Culture

There is no single common safety and security culture across the Ministry, which is not unexpected given there are almost 10,000 staff across a diverse range of services. General staff attitudes appear to have developed based on the nature

of work. For example, CYF commonly deals with situations that are clearly volatile and therefore risky, such as uplifting a child into CYF care from its parents; safety and security are naturally more top of mind than in other service areas.

Observation 19

Our impression from interviews and discussions with other agencies is that the Ministry has historically had a higher tolerance of poor and aggressive client behaviour. Introducing “zero tolerance” effectively and consistently will be a challenge and cultural step change. The work the Ministry has done since the Ashburton event to re-calibrate its risk appetite and set “zero tolerance” is appropriate and expectations will need to be translated into practice.

Staff within the Ministry appear to have a strong customer-service culture, with service delivery and service performance as high priorities, while safety and security are lower priorities. Given the nature of the Ministry’s work, staff can become inured to abusive or threatening behaviour, seeing it as “just part of the job”. Staff understand that the services provided are critical to clients and must be provided. They appreciate that clients may interact with the Ministry during highly stressful times in their lives and that the Ministry deals with some of the most vulnerable people in the community.

Summary and conclusions

The Ministry’s safety and security operating model has evolved over time, rather than being deliberately defined as a consequence of strategic planning.

This is reflected in the extent to which capability is in place and requirements have been defined. While there is some Ministry-wide guidance and policies, major service lines have evolved their own culture and practical approaches for managing risks, based on their service, client and stakeholder characteristics. With such a devolved approach, there is heavy reliance on local site manager’s capabilities and their understanding of risk management practices.

Many of the observations – e.g. around inconsistent practices and culture – are likely to have similar causes rooted in a historic lack of systems-based thinking and explicit design of a safety and security approach. We support the work the Ministry has commenced on risk appetite and the needs it is identifying for Ministry-wide baselines / bottom-lines, strong training and support for staff to equip and empower them to more effectively manage and mitigate safety and security risks.

The observations outlined in the descriptions above indicate that the Ministry’s approach to safety and security is not yet mature and needs to be more cohesively planned and formalised.

What should the Ministry do?

Overview

The Ministry provides its front line services in a context that presents a greater degree of risk to the safety of staff than is typical of many other organisations providing customer services. Combined with an environment that continues to evolve and become more complex, this means it is critical that the Ministry establishes a proactive approach to safety and security that can continually raise the bar in achieving effective mitigation. Compliance with legal obligations is a minimum, and we believe over time the Ministry needs to establish an approach that is well-ahead of this minimum and be able to adapt and adopt good practices as the environment changes.

In this section, we have set out our key recommendations. We have also provided more detailed considerations and a roadmap of activities to help the Ministry implement these over the next two to three years. This time frame is consistent with the experience of other organisations. The more detailed considerations and roadmap are included in Appendix E, which is not for public release as it contains information of a security-sensitive nature.

Consideration of Protective Security Requirements

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Offices of the State Services Commission, New Zealand Security Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Security Bureau have developed the Protective Security Requirements (PSR), which are being considered by government at the time of this report.

The PSR would provide policy, protocols and guidelines to help organisations identify what they must do to protect their people, information and assets. As no two organisations are the same the PSR follows a risk and principles-based approach designed for flexible implementation.

Agency progress in implementing PSR would be measured according to the PSR's Capability Maturity Model. This is intended to support decisions and the direction of resource to protect people, information and assets.

We note the need to reflect the PSR within the safety and security threads of work the Ministry embarks on both in relation to change and business as usual activities.

Key recommendations

We have highlighted the areas of the safety and security operating model that each recommendation addresses.

<p>Recommendation 1</p> <p>The Ministry should formalise and develop its explicit safety and security operating model, based on the Risk Appetite work that has already progressed. This is an over-arching recommendation to create a greater level of formal purpose and control over safety and security. It will involve strategic planning, documentation and agreement to the overall principles and design of safety and security at the Ministry.</p> <p><i>Objective: The Ministry has a clear strategy and definition for its approach to safety and security. This means it is readily able to communicate to staff and other stakeholders what the strategy and approach are, and ultimately how detailed design decisions support the strategy and approach.</i></p>	<p>Risk Appetite</p> <p>Governance</p> <p>Capability</p> <p>Practice</p> <p>Culture</p>
<p>Recommendation 2</p> <p>The Ministry needs to review its organisational structures and roles for coherent and cohesive management of safety and security. This should include specific governance arrangements focussed on safety and security, across all of the Ministry's business streams. Senior Leadership involvement and support is critical.</p> <p><i>Objective: There is consistent and clear accountability and management of safety and security, with timely information flows and decisions, and the ability to continually improve mitigations.</i></p>	<p>Risk Appetite</p> <p>Governance</p> <p>Capability</p> <p>Practice</p> <p>Culture</p>
<p>Recommendation 3</p> <p>The Ministry should complete the assessment of the potential and likely impacts of the Health and Safety Reform Bill on its operations including relationships with third party providers and NGOs. This is important not only for proactive planning of the Ministry's response (e.g. amending current contracting arrangements) but also to promote engagement with other agencies and, if appropriate, provide input into finalisation of the legislation.</p> <p><i>Objective: The Ministry is able to plan its responses to our Review and any other intervening events based on a clear understanding of the implications of new legislation.</i></p>	<p>Risk Appetite</p> <p>Governance</p> <p>Capability</p> <p>Practice</p> <p>Culture</p>

Recommendation 4

The Ministry should review key change initiatives currently underway to determine which initiatives require explicit safety and security threads or expertise to ensure solutions that are approved and implemented provide appropriate risk mitigations.

Objective: The Ministry builds safety and security into “the way we do business” as service design changes are considered and implemented.

Risk Appetite

Governance

Capability

Practice

Culture

Recommendation 5

The Ministry should review whether some of its services (at a detailed level) that tend to create tension or volatile situations could be effectively provided in non face-to-face ways.

Objective: The Ministry is able to reduce its risk exposure, without compromising the effectiveness of services, in specific instances.

Risk Appetite

Governance

Capability

Practice

Culture

Recommendation 6

The Ministry should review its policies and procedures relating to safety and security to ensure they are comprehensive. These need to be wider-scope and more detailed than what is in place at the moment and supplement broader general health & safety policies and procedures.

Development and implementation should be iterative and ensure that Ministry staff are engaged in the process, aware of changes, and involved in evaluating effectiveness.

Objective: The Ministry has more detailed and useful policies and guidance available to its staff, also providing clearer standards to test and monitor compliance.

Risk Appetite

Governance

Capability

Practice

Culture

Recommendation 7

The Ministry should enhance training design, delivery, monitoring and evaluation in relation to the response and mitigation of aggressive client behaviours. This should provide staff with awareness, skills and tools to manage situations and provide a proportionate and effective response to such behaviours. The training should also be integrated with customer service and service delivery training, rather than being an “add on”.

Objective: Ensure that staff have the skills to deal with clients in a way that reduces the frequency of incidents, and are able to act appropriately when an incident does occur.

Risk Appetite

Governance

Capability

Practice

Culture

Recommendation 8

The Ministry should clearly specify and implement standards for its sites and those it shares with other agencies. Individual service areas may have their own specifications based on their risks, but where sites are shared the higher-risk specification should determine the appropriate standards.

This will need to cover multi-agency co-location as well as temporary or satellite sites.

All sites should be subject to review to identify the enhancements that may be required for them to meet the Ministry’s standards.

Objective: Ensure that all service-delivery sites have a standard of safety and security features that is in line with their risk.

Risk Appetite

Governance

Capability

Practice

Culture

Recommendation 9

The Ministry should improve reporting and analysis of incidents and risk information, including:

- Structured and common information standards and definitions to enable analysis and sharing of information
- Enhanced systems and tools to enable safety and security analytics, and information sharing
- Assess and address any usability issues with SOSHI as appropriate

Objective: Provide visibility of identified risks across the Ministry, and insights to decision-makers.

Risk Appetite

Governance

Capability

Practice

Culture

Recommendation 10

The Ministry should review deployment of security guards across sites in terms of numbers and their role. It should consider a site, demographic, hazard/risk specific approach to determining how security guards are deployed for the various types of sites, clarify the skills and competencies required for the role, and specific activities that security guards should carry out. Deployment of security guards should be seen as a component of the Site Security Plan and be subject to periodic review.

It is important to note that deployment of security guards of itself cannot be expected to eliminate the potential for extreme events to occur.

Objective: Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of security guard deployment.

Risk Appetite

Governance

Capability

Practice

Culture

Note that we have also discussed security guards as part of the “Wider government implications” section below.

Recommendation 11

The Ministry should review adequacy of specific equipment that is already used in some areas / instances, but not available or used consistently.

Objective: Ensure that staff consistently have the right tools available and use these to mitigate risks while carrying out their work.

Risk Appetite

Governance

Capability

Practice

Culture

Recommendation 12

The Ministry should promote a more risk-aware culture within the Ministry so that staff attitudes and behaviours reflect and support the desired operating model. We do not believe that this can be effective as a stand-alone “culture initiative” but instead needs to be integrated across each of the other work-streams.

Objective: Ensure that all Ministry staff treat safety and security seriously, and have the knowledge and understanding needed to be effective in their roles.

Risk Appetite

Governance

Capability

Practice

Culture

Having now worked through the review of the wider security environment of the Ministry, and reflecting on our findings from Phase 1, specifically in relation to the extreme event at Ashburton, we are able to affirm our finding from Phase 1 that the event in Ashburton was not preventable. That event was extreme at

every level, and even if the Ministry fully adopts and implements all of our recommendations, while in our view this would improve the overall security environment of the Ministry's workplaces, extreme events could still occur.

Wider government implications

Overview

In conducting this review we have identified a number of implications for the public sector more broadly. As these need to be raised and discussed at appropriate cross-government forums, we have raised these issues with the State Services Commission, as system leader, to consider and lead the development of suitable solutions. The Ministry will be an important participant and stakeholder in these forums.

Information sharing

Various government agencies, particularly in the social sector, have systems and protocols to identify and alert threatening or risky customer behaviour. To date, this information has only been used internally, within the agencies that have identified such risks.

Sharing information about threatening or risky behaviour could provide significant advantages to government organisations, ensuring they are better able and prepared to deal with potential risks or hazardous situations.

Anecdotally, we have heard that there is a common pool of clients with complex and high needs within the social sector. Many suffer from substance abuse (illicit drugs and alcohol) and either behavioural or mental health issues.

The Ministry is likely to interact with most New Zealanders at some points in their life, based on the wide range of services it provides. It is therefore an organisation that has:

- High need – i.e. would benefit broadly from client risk information sharing
- High opportunity – i.e. is one of the organisations most likely to have information relating to risky or threatening behaviour by an individual

Opportunities for analysis and reporting of risk information would be enhanced through inter-agency information sharing on individuals whose behaviour could reasonably be classified as a hazard (as per the Act) – e.g. highlighting regional or demographic trends, or developing predictive analytic models based on common factors. It is our view that such an approach would potentially enhance government sector agency leaders' ability to better understand emerging safety and security risks and more effectively treat those risks. This appears to be consistent with the intent of the [Health and Safety Reform Bill](#) and could deliver improved outcomes for both high need clients and public servants.

We note that although the Privacy Act does not preclude information sharing in certain circumstances, its provisions will need to be considered carefully in any policies and solution design for greater information sharing on individuals whose behaviour may pose a threat to the safety and security of others.

Co-location

As already discussed above (refer “Government expectations” above), the Ministry has a strategic role as the functional lead of the Property Management Centre of Expertise, driving for more co-location of multiple agencies to make efficient use of space and resources within government.

This presents new risks for agencies involved in co-location because visitors to sites will come from a broader (therefore new) set of members of the public, interacting in broader ways at the common site, than any one agency will have prior experience of.

The proposed government PSRs require agencies to consider protective security in a strategic context, considering designing physical and operational workspaces and processes with this in mind. It will be important to consider safety and security explicitly in design and operations of multi-agency sites, requiring collective input from each agency.

Where there is a differential between the protective security profiles of co-located agencies, it is our view that the higher profile should be the one that determines protective security arrangements for that site and for all tenants.

Protective security and guards

As discussed in our recommendations above, the role and competencies of protective security guards should be reviewed and enhanced. It is likely that there is a common need across various agencies, and that common providers currently deliver these services in many instances.

The current investment in contracted guard services across the social sector is significant. While the Ministry increased its guard presence in response to the Ashburton event, we were also informed by other agencies they also moved to increase their guard complement at the same time.

This is likely to present an opportunity for better alignment of these services.

It may be appropriate to consider sector requirements, procurement and service delivery in a collaborative manner across agencies. The creation of a broader pool of resource within government could potentially better enable a surge response in a critical circumstance where inter-operability is enhanced through common recruitment standards, skills and competency development and inter-agency protocols.

Multi-agency change programmes

One of the current government’s priorities has been to drive greater collaboration and “joined up government”. There are a number of multi-agency or cross-sector initiatives underway such as the Children’s Action Plan that the Ministry is leading.

It could be expected that government will increase the pace and number of such programmes. Due to their nature, these programmes expose agencies to new ways of working, new environments and customers – and therefore new risks. A recent example has been the move of social housing assessments from Housing New Zealand Corporation to the Ministry. We are informed that this has in some instances resulted in the Ministry experiencing more clients exhibiting aggressive or abusive behaviours.

Effective ways of ensuring safety and security risks should be considered for such programmes. It may also be appropriate in some circumstances to review existing policy settings – often developed some time ago by agencies in isolation – to ensure that practical risk mitigations can be implemented and operated effectively in the new arrangements.

Mental health

We have heard from staff in the Ministry as well as from other organisations that there is a growing cohort of clients with complex needs that are over-represented in the group of clients displaying aggressive behaviours. Many of the clients suffer from substance abuse, behavioural problems or mental illness.

We also note that Ministry staff reported practical difficulties sharing information and obtaining appropriate support (refer “Practice” above). CYF residence supervisors told us that they believe that there has been a “new” cohort of young people entering the residences in the last few years – i.e. greater numbers presenting with pre-existing mental health issues – and this has affected conduct in the residence and increased the complexity of service delivery at those sites.

We have heard that access to mental health services for some of these more complex cases is inconsistent across the country and at times difficult to obtain. It would seem consistent with the thrust of other initiatives in the social sector that there needs to be a more joined up approach to dealing with these cases.

Some organisations are building their own capability to deal with this trend and such complex cases. There is opportunity to consider more effective collaboration between agencies at both the local and regional levels to respond to these cases.

In the absence of a more coordinated approach to providing joined-up services to clients with highly complex needs, the Ministry may need to consider building its own capability.

Appendix A – Terms of Reference

Review of the physical security environment for the Ministry of Social Development

9 September 2014

Following the tragic shooting of three staff members at the Ashburton Work and Income site, the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development (the Ministry) has commissioned an independent review of the Ministry's physical security environment.

The Review will be carried out by two independent Reviewers supported by an Advisory Group.

Objectives

The objectives of the Review are to answer two questions:

1. Given the Ministry's functions and activities and the risks associated with those, were all practicable steps taken to ensure the safety of Ministry employees in relation to the shooting at the Ashburton office?
2. What changes are recommended to the security environment in Ministry workplaces to ensure the physical safety of staff and members of the public from threats and assaults?

Scope

Question 1 – Specific incident

The Review will satisfy the requirements of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 to "determine whether the occurrence was caused by or arose from a significant hazard." [s7(2)].

The Review will consider the actions of Ministry staff in assessing and managing the risks to physical safety in the events leading up to and including the shooting at the Ashburton office. The Review will not include consideration of the case management or services provided to the alleged offender, nor the criminal matters that will be covered by the Police investigation. The Review will be conducted in a manner that does not potentially prejudice any other investigations.

Question 2 – General environment

The Review will consider the risk to the physical safety of staff and members of the public interacting with the Ministry from threats and assaults. The Review

will not include broader health and safety considerations that arise from other work place hazards.

The security environment includes:

- measures to directly deter and/or de-escalate threats (such as security guards, site access control, CCTV, panic buttons, and staff training), and
- systems to detect, monitor and mitigate potential threats posed by specific individuals (such as identifying potential threats and acting on that information, e.g. by working with NZ Police, use of the remote client unit).

The scope of Ministry workplaces for question 2 will be considered in two phases:

- 2A – public-facing service centres (predominantly Work & Income sites, including services for seniors and students), including those where the Ministry is co-located with other agencies, and
- 2B – all remaining Ministry workplaces, including secure residences, family homes and supervised group homes for children and young people, and locations where Ministry staff visit public or private places as part of their job (such as visiting clients at their homes, or investigating potential fraud).

In considering the safety of the security environment, relevant factors include:

- the likelihood and impact of different types of physical threats to Ministry staff and to members of the public in their interactions with the Ministry
- the type of interactions Ministry staff need to have with members of the public to effectively perform the Ministry's activities, and
- the practical implications of implementing any changes.

The Reviewers will consider any other matters that may be relevant to the objectives of the review.

Timeframes and reporting

The Reviewers should aim to complete Questions 1 and 2A in two weeks, starting Monday 8 September 2014. Question 2B will be completed on a longer timeframe.

Reports on both phases of the Review will be made publicly available, subject to any security restrictions or lawful obligations.

Reviewers and Advisory Group

The Review will be carried out by two independent Reviewers, reporting to the Chief Executive of the Ministry:

- Rob Robinson, former NZ Police Commissioner, and
- Murray Jack, Chairman, Deloitte NZ.

The Reviewers will be supported by an Advisory Group to test thinking and emerging recommendations. The members are:

- Sir Maarten Wevers (Chair), former Chief Executive, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
- Glenn Barclay, National Secretary, Public Service Association
- Craig Sims, Chief Operating Officer, ANZ, and
- Graham Maloney, First Assistant Secretary, Service Delivery Operations, Department of Human Services (Australia).

Different and/or additional members of the Advisory Group may be added for question 2B of the Review. The team will be supplemented by specific security expertise as required.

Views of Ministry staff will be actively sought through the Review. The Review will be supported by a secretariat from the Ministry.

The Reviewers may need to liaise with the Police criminal investigation and prosecution and the subsequent Coroner's investigation into the incident. The Review team will be able to draw on dedicated legal expertise from the Crown Law Office.

Appendix B – Legislative and policy framework

Key terms

It is important to understand several terms in the context of this Review. The following specific terms are defined as part of New Zealand’s legislative and regulatory environment for health and safety in the workplace.

Table 4: Key terms

Term	Definition
Hazard	<p>means an activity, arrangement, circumstance, event, occurrence, phenomenon, process, situation, or substance (whether arising or caused within or outside a place of work) that is an actual or potential cause or source of harm; and</p> <p>includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a situation where a person's behaviour may be an actual or potential cause or source of harm to the person or another person; and • without limitation, a situation described in subparagraph (i) resulting from physical or mental fatigue, drugs, alcohol, traumatic shock, or another temporary condition that affects a person's behaviour <p><u>Refer:</u> Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1992/0096/latest/DLM278835.html?search=sw_096be8ed80d007f4_Hazard_25_se&p=1&sr=1 Worksafe NZ – Glossary of Terms and Acronyms http://www.business.govt.nz/worksafe/tools-resources/glossary-of-terms-and-acronyms/h-to-k</p>
All practicable steps	<p>In the Act, all practicable steps, in relation to achieving any result in any circumstances, means all steps to achieve the result that it is reasonably practicable to take in the circumstances, having regard to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the nature and severity of the harm that may be suffered if the result is not achieved; and • the current state of knowledge about the likelihood that harm of that nature and severity will be suffered if the result is not achieved; and • the current state of knowledge about harm of that nature; and • the current state of knowledge about the means available to achieve the result, and about the likely efficacy of each of those means; and • the availability and cost of each of those means. <p>To avoid doubt, a person required by the Act to take all practicable steps is required to take those steps only in respect of circumstances that the person knows or ought reasonably to know about.</p> <p><u>Refer:</u> Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, section 2A: inserted, on 5 May 2003, by section 5 of the Health and Safety in Employment Amendment Act 2002 (2002 No 86).</p>

Hierarchy of controls

Common good practice in health and safety internationally, as well as in New Zealand, includes a hierarchy of controls to mitigate risks from hazards. The Ministry's hierarchy of controls – which is consistent with good practice – is as follows:

Table 5: Hierarchy of controls

Term	Definition
Eliminate	Eliminate the hazard; that is remove it. A significant hazard will be considered to have been eliminated when the source of the hazard has been completely removed from the place of work. Substituting one substance or process for another may have removed the original hazard, but introduced a new hazard. The new hazard will have to be identified. If this is not practical you must Isolate
Isolate	The process or procedure must separate the employee from the hazard, e.g. placing a barrier between the employee and the hazard. If this is not practical you must Minimise
Minimise	Minimise the likelihood of harm from the hazard, e.g. through safe working procedures, personal protective equipment, training staff.

Appendix C – Operating context

Key legislation and implications

The Ministry administers the following legislation:

- Social Security Act 1964
- Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989
- Adoption Act 1995; Adoption (Intercountry) Act 1997; Adult Adoption Information Act 1985 (operational administration)
- Vulnerable Children's Act 2014
- Disabled Persons Community Welfare Act 1975 (Parts I, III and IV)
- Education Act 1989, Part XXV (Student Allowances)
- Employment Services and Income Support (Integrated Administration) Act 1998
- Department of Child, Youth and Family Services Act 1999
- Department of Social Welfare Act 1971
- Social Welfare (Reciprocity Agreements, and New Zealand Artificial Limb Service) Act 1990
- New Zealand Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001 (Part 1 and Schedule 1)
- Social Workers Registration Act 2003
- Student Loan Scheme Act 2011
- Children's Commissioner Act 2003
- Families Commission Act 2003
- New Zealand Sign Language Act 2006
- Family Benefits (Home Ownership) Act 1964

The activities and service obligations of the Ministry are largely covered in the above legislation. In many cases, the discretionary nature of the provisions and the ability to satisfy the provisions in a multitude of ways provides the Ministry with flexibility in how services are delivered.

Practical requirements for face-to-face interactions

Face-to-face interaction with clients and the public (which can have a safety and security implication) cannot be avoided by the Ministry, if it is to meet its service responsibilities in a practical way.

The principles in section 1B of the [Social Security Act](#) highlight the priority for people of working age to find and retain work, and those for whom work may not currently be an appropriate outcome, to be assisted to prepare for work in the future and develop employment-focused skills. To achieve this, the Ministry requires certain beneficiaries to participate in seminars, attend interviews, work ability assessments, undertake training etc. In most cases, this involves face-to-face interactions with Ministry staff and/or third parties.

The [Children, Young Persons and their Families Act](#) requires the Ministry to ensure family participation in decision-making (Section 5), which will often mean face-to-face interactions. To effectively investigate a report of ill-treatment, a Social Worker will usually need to attend homes and interact with the client and their family, and a Court may make an order under section 78 enabling a social worker to uplift a child from any place.

Like many agencies, the Ministry continually seeks to improve its service channels by adopting new technology to achieve efficiencies, improve access to services and better meet client needs. However, as the examples above illustrate, the Ministry will always have face-to-face service requirements.

Obligation to deliver services to clients

The Ministry cannot withdraw services if a client is abusive, aggressive or threatens staff.

In the case of children and young persons, the legislation requires the Ministry to act and provide services to any client where a need has been identified or valid concerns over safety have been alerted.

Other services are provided to any client with a statutory entitlement. In some cases (such as the Social Security Act) the Ministry has discretionary powers to impose obligations on clients, but this scope is limited and does not include threatening behaviour.

In short, there are generally no direct consequences for aggressive, abusive or threatening behaviour under the Ministry's legislation. However, there are indirect consequences if their behaviour causes the Ministry to be concerned about the safety of children or clients fail an obligation. The main legislative regime providing sanctions for inappropriate behaviours clients is the [Crimes Act 1961](#). We note that Part 11 of this act clearly specifies threats to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm as a crime. Other aggressive behaviours are also potentially breaches of the [Crimes Act](#), the [Summary Offences Act](#) or other statute.

Legal obligations relating to staff safety and security

The principal legislation relevant to security in the context of this Review is the [Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992](#) ("the Act"). Appendix B includes information about the Act and the relevant policy framework.

The key obligation relates to taking "all practicable steps" to ensure staff safety. This is generally interpreted as what a "reasonable person" would do. With greater public focus on health and safety and other organisations strengthening their operating models, we believe it is likely that the bar for what is considered "reasonable" will keep rising.

The [Health and Safety Reform Bill](#) currently before Parliament, if passed, will make explicit and clarify obligations, in particular relating to:

- The concept of “person conducting a business or undertaking” (PCBU). PCBUs must ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, the health and safety of workers engaged (whether by the PCBU or others) in the business or undertaking. This duty also applies to workers whose activities are influenced or directed by the PCBU. The worker does not need to be an employee or contractor of the PCBU.
- Strengthening accountability of officers of organisations and their leadership.
- Introducing a due diligence duty for officers (senior management and directors).

This will have significant implications for the Ministry, including the obligations that will arise from the involvement of third parties in service delivery arrangements with and for the Ministry.

Government expectations

Better public services

In 2012, the Government set 10 challenging results for the public sector to achieve over the next five years. The Ministry and its Chief Executive (CE) have direct responsibility for a number of these results.

Table 6: Responsibility for better public services results

Result	Responsibility
Reducing long term welfare dependence	The Ministry's CE is the lead for this result, supported by the Secretary of Education and the Director-General of Health. The agencies of the Social Sector Forum have agreed to share responsibility for delivering the results.
Supporting vulnerable children <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase participation in early childhood education • Increase infant immunisation rates and reduce the incidence of rheumatic fever • Reduce the number of assaults on children 	<p>The Ministries of Social Development, Education, and Health are working together, alongside the Police and the Social Sector Forum, on these three results that will support vulnerable children.</p> <p>The Ministry's CE is the lead for these results, supported by the Secretary of Education and the Director-General of Health. The agencies of the Social Sector Forum have agreed to share responsibility for delivering the results.</p>

The Ministry's role in the Social Sector Forum (SSF) is described in "Cross-government leadership" below. The membership is

- Chief Executive of the Ministry for Social Development
- Secretary for Justice
- Secretary of Education
- Director-General of Health
- Deputy Chief Executive Building and Housing, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment.

Cross-government leadership

Addressing the most complex issues requires government agencies to work with each other, providers, interest groups and the community.

There is an increased emphasis on sector-wide accountability for addressing the entire needs of an individual or family. The Ministry's Chief Executive is currently responsible for leading action to reduce long-term benefit receipt and the cross-agency efforts to achieve results relating to the support of vulnerable children as outlined above.

The Ministry also supports the delivery of other results to boost educational achievement, reduce crime and improve access to online services.

We are advised that this focus on a set of shared targets has influenced the Ministry's key priorities and work programmes, supported a shift to greater interagency collaboration and driven more effective use of data to target interventions and inform choices.

The Social Sector Forum provides cross-agency leadership in the social sector

The increasing oversight and accountability for interagency initiatives through sector bodies provides an opportunity for assessing the choices and trade-offs that fiscal constraints require. We understand that this may sometimes mean that collective imperatives supersede individual departmental objectives.

The SSF is currently mandated by, and reports to, the Cabinet Social Policy Committee. Recent practice has been for the Chair of the Cabinet Social Policy Committee to lead cross-agency work in the social sector. SSF collectively governs and drives cross-agency work in the sector to achieve better results for individuals, families and communities.

As Chair of SSF, the Ministry's Chief Executive has the lead responsibility for cross-agency work. He also chairs two associated governance groups - the Joint

Venture Board, which oversees the Social Sector Trials¹, and the Vulnerable Children's Board, overseeing the Children's Action Plan².

The Ministry is the Functional Lead across government for property

The State Services Commission has established Functional Lead roles to drive performance and efficiency across the whole public service in the areas of IT, procurement and property.

As the property lead, the Ministry is responsible for using the collective purchasing power of the public service to drive cost reductions and actively exploring co-location opportunities to make the most efficient use of space and resources. Property savings across the public sector are expected to produce approximately \$109 million per year by 2023. With that role, the Ministry has the ability to define and influence safety and security requirements into purchasing requirements.

¹ The Social Sector Trials have been established to test innovative ideas to improve social, health and educational outcomes for communities around New Zealand. The Social Sector Trials involve the Ministries of Education, Health, Justice and Social Development, and the New Zealand Police working together to change the way that social services are delivered.

² The Children's Action Plan is a living document for New Zealanders to understand what action is being taken to protect children. It was developed to provide a framework to achieve the fundamental changes contained in the White Paper for Vulnerable Children (released on the 11th of October 2012).

Appendix D – Service delivery

Overview of service interactions

The Ministry provides a diverse set of services, with both common and different stakeholders and client groups. We have summarised the nature of service delivery and interactions in this section to highlight the complex environment in which the Ministry operates.

The following list of services has been used below to summarise the types of client interactions.

1. Managing the statutory care and protection of vulnerable children and young people, youth justice, and adoption services
2. Providing financial assistance and support to working-age New Zealanders and helping people get into sustainable work
3. Assessing eligibility for social housing
4. Providing entitlements to seniors, and assisting students to overcome financial barriers to higher education
5. Contracting and funding a mix of services, programme delivery, and community development initiatives designed to strengthen local communities and families, such as parenting programmes
6. Upholding the integrity of the benefit system and minimising debt levels of people the Ministry works with



The Ministry also focuses on specific groups through the Office for Disability Issues, Ministry of Youth Development and Office for Senior Citizens. These services do not involve extensive public contact.

The icons used in the tables below reference the above services. Note that the tables list typical and general interactions – it has not been within our scope or our intention to provide an exhaustive description of all of the Ministry's interactions with clients and the public.

Non face-to-face interactions

Table 7: Types of non face-to-face interactions across services

Service	Interactions
	<p>Significant volumes of work are completed through the CYF Contact Centre, including receipt and processing of notifications and referrals from other agencies, and of requests under information-sharing Memoranda of Understanding with other government agencies.</p> <p>The CYF Contact Centre operates 24/7 and is a first point of call for professionals and members of the public wanting to contact staff members, seek information or report a concern about a child or young person. It is responsible for assessing reports of concern and making decisions about which require a statutory response and which can be managed in collaboration with community partners.</p> <p>During normal business hours and days it operates a two-tiered system with all calls being answered by a Customer Service Team (Tier 1) and then either referred to a Contact Centre Social Worker (Tier 2) or to another part of the organisation.</p> <p>Reports of Concern received electronically or information-sharing agreements with other government agencies are processed and actioned by a mix of Resource Assistants and Social Work staff.</p> <p>Outside of business hours the CYF Contact Centre operates an emergency only service to support and provide direction for all after-hours staff, manage emergency issues and call-outs, provide ongoing support for caregivers, contain matters that do not require an emergency response, and escalate risks and issues to senior management after hours.</p>
	<p>The Work and Income Contact Centres and Online Services (My Account accessed via RealMe) deal with general enquiries. They are also used to make appointments with staff.</p> <p>Some hardship payments are processed through the Contact Centres.</p> <p>Job Connect is used by both employers and job seekers alike to access employment opportunities and information</p> <p>The Remote Client Unit (RCU) is used to deliver services to clients identified as high risk.</p>
	<p>The Work and Income Contact Centres deal with general enquiries. They are also used to make appointments with staff.</p>
	<p>The Work and Income Contact Centres, StudyLink Contact Centre and Online Services (My Account accessed via RealMe) deal with general enquiries. They are also used to make appointments with staff.</p> <p>Most Community Services Card and Super Gold Card transactions are managed remotely by mail or cards are automatically issued.</p> <p>The RCU is used to deliver services to senior clients (not students) identified as high risk.</p>
	<p>Community Investment has a National Office number and a number of listed helplines that deal with general enquiries.</p>
	<p>The Integrity Intervention Centre (IIC) runs the Integrity Intervention Line and Allegation Line to deal with enquiries related to allegations and fraud suspicions.</p>

Face-to-face interactions at Ministry sites

Table 8: Types of face-to-face interactions at Ministry sites across services

Service	Interactions
	<p>Service sites are used for interviews, meetings and some Family Group Conferences (FGCs). This includes with children and young persons (CYP), their whanau / family, caregivers and other stakeholders.</p> <p>Care & Protection and Youth Justice residences are used for clients who pose a significant risk to themselves or others e.g. due to behavioural issues, or who have been placed there through youth justice processes. These are secure facilities with controlled access.</p> <p>CYF Family Homes and Group Homes are used to provide care for some CYP.</p>
	<p>Sites are used for appointments between clients and Ministry staff (e.g. Case Managers). Clients may be required to drop off forms or related documentation which are then assessed, confirmed and processed by Ministry staff.</p>
	<p>Sites are used for assessment interviews and meetings between clients and Ministry staff. Clients may provide Ministry staff with forms and supporting documentation. Ministry staff also verify client information and their circumstances.</p>
	<p>Sites are used for appointments between clients and Work and Income / StudyLink staff. Clients may be required to drop off forms or related documentation which are then assessed, confirmed and processed by Ministry staff.</p>
	<p>Sites are used for meetings, interviews, and seminars. Site facilities may be used by other organisations and community groups. Note that Heartland sites or NGO premises are sometimes used for FGCs (in relation to services 1 and 2 above).</p>
	<p>It is rare for a client to physically enter an Integrity Services site. Interaction is typically conducted via telephone or through an advocate acting on the client's behalf.</p>

Offsite face-to-face interactions

Table 9: Types of offsite face-to-face interactions across services


Service	Interactions
	<p>Staff typically use the Ministry's fleet of motor vehicles for offsite travel and for taking CYP to medical appointments, sport, offsite programmes. Air travel is sometimes needed to transit children and young people.</p> <p>Meetings with clients and many FGCs may be held offsite, e.g. in public or community spaces.</p> <p>Staff attend Court hearings as required.</p> <p>CYF staff travel to specific sites (e.g. homes) to complete assessments and carry out ongoing interventions with the CYP and their families. These locations can be remote and occasionally out of cell-phone coverage. CYF staff will also have direct contact with families where they need to take a CYP into care, and these are often volatile situations.</p> <p>Some specialist vehicles with GPS tracking are used for transport of youth justice clients (e.g. from residences to Court) but ordinary motor vehicles are also used.</p> <p>Staff may travel in pairs or request assistance from the Police where safety and security concerns have been identified.</p>
	<p>Staff typically use the Ministry's fleet of motor vehicles for offsite travel. This may include offsite visits such as visiting homes of clients, workplaces, public or community spaces or other locations as part of the Ministry's Outreach service.</p>
	<p>Staff typically use the Ministry's fleet of motor vehicles for offsite travel.</p>
	<p>Staff typically use the Ministry's fleet of motor vehicles for offsite travel. This may include offsite visits such as visiting, public or community spaces or other locations as part of the Ministry's Outreach service – e.g. at universities to provide services to students.</p>
	<p>Staff typically use the Ministry's fleet of motor vehicles for offsite travel, e.g. to NGO service locations.</p>
	<p>National Fraud Investigation Unit staff typically use the Ministry's fleet of motor vehicles for offsite travel. This may include visiting homes of people being investigated and attending Court Hearings as required.</p>

Various modes, channels and locations for service delivery

The diagram over the page illustrates the various types of facilities and sites used by the Ministry to provide services. We have broken this down into three broad categories, being:

- **Non face-to-face interactions:** examples of which may be services provided over the phone or through digital media
- **Face-to-face interactions at Ministry sites:** where clients and other stakeholders interact directly with Ministry staff at various Ministry sites
- **Face-to-face interactions offsite:** where clients and other stakeholders interact directly with Ministry staff at various locations that are not Ministry sites

Figure 2: Types of locations for service delivery



The following provides a brief description of the various types of service locations presented at a high-level above:

- Eight Contact Centres are used for dealing with general enquiries over the phone or by email, including setting up appointments for visits to service centres / sites. This also includes significant volumes of digital information processing such as Family Violence Referrals to CYF from the Police.

The Remote Client Unit (RCU) is used by Work and Income to provide case management via phone, email, fax and mail to clients who have been trespassed from sites and / or pose a high risk to the safety of frontline staff. If a client has been trespassed they have the opportunity to appoint an agent to deal with Work and Income on their behalf. If they are unable or unwilling to appoint an agent, a client is passed over to the RCU. One of the aims of the RCU is to return clients to “normal service” at an appropriate time, and client risk assessments are done prior to expiry of trespass notices.

- There are 33 locations used for a range of specific processing activities or as support centres for the regional network of service sites. Occasionally, clients, their agents or other stakeholders will have face-to-face interactions with Ministry staff. For example, this includes walk-ins at a Seniors Support Centre or client agents meeting with an investigator in a Fraud Investigation Unit. CYF client contact at regional level is confined to management of complaints and management of escalated issues. Members of the public attend CYF Specialist Services Units for matters such as evidential interviewing and specialist assessment and counselling.

- These are what would commonly be considered “branches” – i.e. primary customer-facing services sites. There are over 170 sites across the country, including 140 Service Delivery Service Centres, and 64 CYF Service Sites. In around 35 instances, CYF and Work and Income sites are co-located in the same building (usually on separate floors).

There are also sites co-located with a range of other agencies, including the new Durham Street site in Christchurch where Inland Revenue is a co-tenant, and Community Link sites that typically have a number of NGOs and / or other government agencies sharing space with the Ministry.

- There are eight Residences operated by CYF and a ninth which is operated by a third party NGO. These are specialist facilities with secure and restricted access.

Around 80 CYF Family Homes and Family Group Homes are used to care for children and young persons where this type of placement is appropriate. In many cases, care is provided by people who are not Ministry staff.

- Service at 29 Satellite Sites was suspended after the Ashburton event. These are typically general office spaces shared part-time by the Ministry

with other businesses or local agencies.

The Ministry manages a network of 34 Heartland Sites that provide access to broad government and NGO services in rural areas. 12 of these are co-located with Service Delivery Service Centres, and 22 are coordinated through contracts held with NGOs that include one territorial authority in the Chatham Islands and one District Court in Westport.

Outreach services are often provided at other agencies' locations – for example, setting up service areas for students at Universities.

CYF staff attend Court proceedings, e.g. in a youth justice context or where Court is determining custody arrangements for a child or young person (CYP).

MSD Legal Staff also appear in both the Family and District Courts and before the Social Security Appeal Authority.

Ministry staff also organise meetings in schools and in public facilities such as libraries or municipal buildings and on marae grounds. CYF Social Workers will also meet with children, young people and their families in public areas such as parks and cafes for supervised contact, informal meetings and discussions. CYF staff are also involved in meetings at the offices of NGO partners or government agencies.

Ministry staff visit Private Workplaces as part of seeking employment opportunities for its clients. Visits to Private Homes are required, particularly by CYF Social Workers, e.g. to conduct safety assessments, uplift children into CYF care, or interact with clients and caregivers as part of ongoing case management.

Appendix E – Considerations and roadmap for recommendations (not for public release)

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